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ABSTRACT 
 
Three Essays on Monetary Policy, the Financial Market, and Economic  
 
Growth in the U.S. and China.  (December 2006) 
 
Juan Yang, B.A., Renmin University of China; 
M.A., Renmin University of China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. David J. Leatham 
 
Does monetary policy affect the real economy?  If so, what is the transmission 
mechanism or channel through which these effects occur?  These two questions are 
among the most important and controversial in macroeconomics.  This dissertation 
presents some new empirical evidence that addresses each question for the U.S. and 
Chinese economies. 
Literature on monetary transmission suggests that the monetary policy can take 
effect on the real economy through several ways.  The most noteworthy one is credit 
channels, including the bank lending channel and the interest channel.   
First, I use a new method to test for structural breaks in the U.S. monetary policy 
history and present some new empirical evidence to support an operative bank lending 
channel in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.   Results show that an 
operative bank lending channel existed in 1955 to 1968, and its impact on the economy 
has become much smaller since 1981, but it still has a significant buffering effect on 
output by attenuating the effect of the interest channel.   
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Second, I adopt the recently developed time series technique to explore the 
puzzling negative correlation between output and stock returns in China currently, and 
posit that it is due to a negative link between monetary policy and stock returns when 
monetary policy increases output.  The monetary policy has not been transmitted well in 
the public sector which is the principal part of Chinese stock market, and increased 
investment capital from monetary expansion goes to real estate sector instead of the 
stock market. 
Last, I demonstrate how monetary policy has been transmitted into the public and 
private sectors of China through the credit channel.  The fundamental identification 
problem inherent in using aggregated data that leads to failure in isolating demand shock 
from supply shock is explicitly solved by introducing control factors.  I find that the 
monetary policy has great impact on private sector rather than public sector through 
credit channel in China.   
These findings have important practical implications for U.S. and China’s 
economic development by improving the efficiency of the monetary policy because a 
comprehensive understanding of monetary transmission will lead to better policy design.   
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between the monetary policy acting through channels and 
economic growth is still a very open question, and there is not a common agreement.  
The relationship is crucial because it has significantly different implications for 
development policy.  One could argue that if monetary policy exerts an economically 
large impact on growth, then policies should aim towards legal, regulatory, and policy 
reforms designed to promote policy development.  However, if economic growth 
stimulates the monetary policy, then more emphasis should be placed on other growth-
enhancing policies.   The policy emphasis is to stimulate monetary policy or to stimulate 
other policies for economic growth, and this is the question solved in this study.   
This dissertation aims to explore if monetary policy really effects economy. The 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy is studied in U.S. and China.   The purpose 
of this dissertation is to provide a more accurate analysis for monetary transmission 
(channels), and predict the effects a general policy would have if put in force or to 
predict relevant differences resulting from alternative policies.  This information is 
important for policy design and decision making in promoting national economy.  
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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Specifically, the chapter II tests for structural breaks in the U.S. monetary policy 
history, and investigates if monetary policy is effective through bank lending channels  
in U.S.  Chapter III investigates why there is puzzling negative relationship between 
stock returns and real activity in China even though this relationship is contrary to 
common sense and economic theory.  Chapter IV answers two questions: (1) does the 
credit channel of monetary transmission exist in China, and (2) has monetary policy 
been transmitted differently to the public and private sectors of China. 
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CHAPTER II 
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY 
Introduction 
There is no doubt that monetary policy plays an important role in the real macro 
economy, and it is important to know how monetary policy achieves its goal; therefore 
the transmission mechanism (channel) is a key component to monetary policy.  Recently 
most economists agree that monetary policy actions transmitted through various 
interrelated channels have a significant impact on real economic activity, at least in short 
run, though, monetary policy shocks do not affect output in the current period.  However, 
very little is known about the specifics of the monetary transmission mechanism and the 
means by which monetary policy affects the economy (i.e. the monetary transmission 
mechanism).  These issues have long been debated.  The traditional view of monetary 
transmission places emphasis on the money, attributing all of the forces of monetary 
policy to the shift of money supply, which changes the interest rate and spending.  That 
is to say, when policy makers decide to tighten the money, they drain bank reserves.  
The loss of reserves reduces the supply of deposits that require reserves, which drives up 
interest rates.  The higher cost of capital then reduces investment spending by firms and 
consumers.  The key assumption here is a perfect financial market; the possibility that 
policy also affects the relative sources of funds that firms use to finance their spending is 
not considered.  All funds are assumed to be perfect substitutes.  If information problems 
 4
 
 
occur, preventing firms from substituting easily among alternate sources of funds, the 
credit view of monetary policy identifies two possible credit channels: a bank lending 
channel and a broader balance sheet channel. 
These two channels are broadly acknowledged as operative.  The balance sheet 
channel takes effect when an increase in liquidity lowers interest rates and pushes people 
to transform their excess liquidity into investment and thus provide better returns.  
Interest rates are the major policy tool in this channel, thus it can also be called the 
interest channel.  Kashyap and Stein (1994) define the bank lending channel as follows: 
“…monetary policy can work not only through its impact on the bond-market rate of 
interest, but also through its independent impact on the supply of intermediated loans…”  
The bank lending channel implies that the Federal Reserve can influence real income by 
controlling the level of intermediated loans.  
Economists often believe that the interest channel is the major channel between 
monetary policy and the real economy, yet the relative ineffectiveness of falling interest 
rates to promote economic growth in the 1990s highlighted the importance of exploring 
additional channels for monetary policies.  One of the alternatives worthy of more 
attention is the bank lending channel. 
The bank lending channel was brought to the forefront of economic discussion 
by Bernanke and Blinder in 1988.  They present conditions that must be satisfied for the 
lending channel to be operative: (1) the supply of bank loans is not fully insulated from 
changes in reserves induced by the monetary policy, and (2) the demand of bank loans is 
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not fully insulated from changes in the availability of bank loans.  When the first 
condition holds, a tightening of monetary policy directly causes the contraction of credit 
issued by banks.  The second condition implies that the bank loans are an imperfect 
substitute for other sources of finance for business.  Put together, these two conditions 
state that bank loans are special, and cannot be substituted with other items on the 
balance sheets of both banks and non-financial firms.   
Several papers have demonstrated the empirical evidence for the existence of a 
bank lending channel.  Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find that banks lend more to large 
firms and less to small ones after a tightening of monetary policy.  Lang and Nakamura 
(1995) argue that banks make proportionally more safe loans during a financial crisis.  
Morgan (1998) uses a contractual difference between loan under commitment and loan 
without commitment across commercial bank loans to test for credit effects.  Perez 
(1998) found that the bank lending channel did exist in the 1960s but is no longer 
operative.  Kishan and Opiela (2002) provide evidence of a bank lending channel in the 
United States from 1980 to 1995. 
Despite widespread empirical studies on the bank lending channel, the existence 
of an operative lending channel remains uncertain.  The major criticism is that aggregate 
data used in previous approaches does not control the demand factors (Olinear and 
Rudebusch 1996).  A decline in bank loans during tightening of monetary policy may be 
caused either by a cutback in lending by banks or by a decline in loan demand brought 
on by the weakened economy through other channels of monetary policy.  Thus many 
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researchers turn to the bank level and firm level data to study the individual borrower’s 
reactions.  This type of approach has two major drawbacks:  (1) it fails to directly 
measure the macroeconomic significance, and (2) it inadequately distinguishes isolated 
loan demand and supply.   
The way to identify loan demand and supply remains unsolved, thus more work 
is needed on this topic.  Peek et al. (2003) propose a creative way try to solve this 
problem.  They use the commercial forecasts of GDP to control demand shocks, use the 
bank health variable to capture the supply effects, and apply ensuing tests to ensure the 
identification of loan supply effects.  However, they admit the commercial forecasts of 
GDP fail to account completely for the disturbances of demand shocks in the short-run 
and so the possibility of errors exists.  Moreover, the tests they conducted were 
insufficient to show the existence of an operative bank lending channel.  I will solve this 
problem by dividing the whole sample into three sub-periods, which is suggested by 
recently developed test.  More discussions are presented in next section.   
The Federal Reserve can control bank loans by reducing the quantity of reserves.  
The reduction in reserves forces a reduction in the level of deposits, and this must be 
matched by a fall in loans.  In other words, the contraction in bank balance sheets 
reduces the level of loans.  The bank lending channel theory posits that during monetary 
contractions, banks restrict some firms’ loans, thus reducing their desired investment 
independently from interest rates.  I start my study by checking whether the bank 
lending channel did exist in U.S. history.  Theory also suggests that one of the 
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mechanisms through which bank loans affect the real economy is by influencing 
investment and thus indirectly impacting the real economy.  This chapter will test this 
hypothesis as well.  The other general assumption is that the bank lending channel is 
currently not operative.  I also will investigate this assumption.   
The chapter proceeds as follows.  The next section (section 2) briefly introduces 
the methodology used, section 3 describes the data set, and section 4 presents the 
advanced SUP-LM test I apply and propose two sub-samples, then section 5 investigates 
the causality inference in the two sub-samples.  Last, the results are compared in these 
sub-samples and conclusion is drawn with the policy implications. 
Methodology 
One of the key questions in studying the effectiveness of monetary policy is the 
identification problem, that is to say, we need to identify those monetary actions 
responded to shock of output from those pure actions supposed to be exogenous control 
to economy.  The other important and more interesting question is how change of 
monetary policy influent on the economy, being so-called transmission channels 
including the bank lending channel and interest channel.  This chapter will bear on each 
question since they are so important and guidable to the decision makers. 
Romer and Romer (1994) addressed these questions by using the historical 
record to identify times when the Federal Reserve appeared to shift to tighter monetary 
policy not in response to real economy but just seeking to cut output in order to lower 
 8
 
 
inflation. They found that “these policy shifts were followed by large and statistically 
significant declines in real output relative to its usual behavior”, and so they interpreted 
these results as supporting the view that monetary policy has substantial real effects.  
Christino, Eichenbaum and Evans (1994) proposed an alternative approach: VAR based 
approach, and their key point was that by subtracting the monetary actions responded to 
exogenous output shock from the actually total monetary actions taken they can isolate 
the pure monetary policy actions and then analyze how these actions influence the 
output.  This type of approach as well as Romer and Romer index might just describe the 
possible policy shift in the short-run (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1994), but not 
referring to long-run structure, however, the shift of monetary policy takes impact the 
economy in both long run and short run.  The blank is filled by adopting recently 
developed SUP-LM test to check the long run equilibrium stability in the monetary 
policy transmission system.   
The SUP-LM statistic is a simple function of the data and the restricted MLE, 
therefore it is computationally easy and fast.  The method is based on the weighted 
power criterion function with respect to the randomized nuisance parameter.  It is 
assumed to know the admissible range of change point, which is a symmetrically set 
such as [0.05, 0.95], [0.15, 0.85] or [0.25, 0.75] of total observations.  When no extra 
information on the structure change provided, a wider testable range could capture any 
possible structural changes.  
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In fact, government interventions and policy changes at designated times can 
influence economic structure.  What we need to know is the way certain monetary policy 
shift changes the real economy.  In a changing economy, the channels of monetary 
transmission are unlikely to be constant over time, so test will be conducted to check 
whether the long run equilibrium is stable for bank lending channel and interest channel.  
The stability of long-run relationships can be statistically assessed by testing structural 
change of the cointegrating vector among variables in Error Correction Model.  By using 
recently developed SUP-LM test (Byeongseon Seo 1998), we can test for unknown 
changing points in an fixed interval.   
SUP-LM tests offer us the break points in the long run pattern of monetary policy, 
and combined with famous Romer and Romer date which could be addressed as shifts in 
short run structure (1991), this study outline all the possible shifts and isolate several 
sub-samples in which I believe no structure break in error correction model individually.  
The idea is to isolate episodes in which the change in policy controlled variables such as 
bank loans, interest rate was both purposeful and large, and to examine the behavior of 
economy to the shock, thereby this study precisely study the impulse response and other 
time properties among variables interested and then figure out if certain monetary 
transmission mechanism such as bank lending channel exist, as said in Bernanke and 
Blinder (1998) “Impulse response functions for all variables in the system with respect 
to the policy shock can then be calculated and can be interpreted as the true structural 
response to policy shocks” .   
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Since the data are time series data, and observations are probably non-stationary, 
accordingly, it might well expect to model the U.S. banking and monetary data as an 
error correction model.  Modeling the innovations from such a model will allow us to 
comment on the causal structure in contemporaneous time and then identify the short run 
and long run structure of series.  Such models were first introduced in Swanson and 
Granger (1997), and have been developed by others such as Bessler and Yang (2003).  
In common, the new methods Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) is used to identify the 
contemporaneous causality in error correction model in these studies.  Causal inference 
on directed graphs (DAGs) has recently been developed by Spirtes, Glymour and 
Scheines (2000), and Pearl (2000).  This method is able to shed light on 
contemporaneous relationships.  The directed graphs literature is an attempt to infer 
causal relations from observational data.  The key idea is to use a statistical measure of 
independence, commonly a measure of conditional correlation, to systematically check 
the patterns of conditional independence and dependence and to work backwards to the 
class of admissible causal structures. (Hoover, 2005)  While computers can be used to 
sort out causal flows from spurious flows and can sometimes distinguish an effect from a 
cause, human intelligence is helpful to select the set of candidate variables (causal 
sufficient set) for the computer to study.  The causal sufficiency assumption suggests 
finding a sufficiently rich set of theoretically relevant variables upon which to conduct 
the analysis, i.e., there is no omitted latent variable that causes two variables included in 
the study.  One of the advantages of using directed graphs is that results based on 
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properties of the data can be compared to a prior knowledge of a structural model 
suggested by economic theory or subjective intuition (Awokuse and Bessler, 2003). 
Basically, I use the error correction model combined with directed graphs to 
show the contemporaneous causality structure on innovations.  Such structures can be 
identified through the directed graphs analysis of the correlation (covariance) matrix of 
observed innovations .  In this chapter, directed graphs are used to help in providing 
data-based evidence on causal ordering in contemporaneous time, assuming the 
information set is causally sufficient.  Moreover, the error correction model will allow us 
to identify the long-run and short-run time structure of the series, thereby I could get 
clear view on relationship among bank loans, interest rate and real output.  In summary,  
the complete properties of the time series will be studied and a clear acting pattern 
among loan, interest and output will be proposed, and thus this study provide stronger 
support for the existence of bank lending channel or interest channel. 
teˆ
Some other frequently used methods to identify the existence of bank lending 
channel include such as Granger Causality (1969), but this method has obvious 
drawbacks.  For example, variable A Granger causes variable B if knowledge of variable 
A and its past history help to predict variable B.  In essence, variable A Granger causes 
variable B is a test that variable A precedes variable B in a predictive sense.  
Nevertheless, as Granger himself notes, Granger causality implies temporal 
predictability but does not address the issue of control: “If Y [Granger] causes X, it does 
not  necessarily mean that Y can be used to control X.” (Granger, 1980) The difference 
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is important; because an analysis based on Granger causality can answer the question, 
“Does knowledge of the level of loans extended help the Federal Reserve predict real 
income?” However, it cannot answer the question “Will the Federal Reserve’s attempt to 
restrict the availability of loans reduce real income?” (Perez, 1998) 
Another method to determine the causal order is suggested by Hoover (1990). 
The notion of causal order employed by Hoover is due to Simon (1957); a variable L 
causes Y if control of L renders Y controllable. This methodology requires examination 
of the stability of the marginal and conditional distribution of Y and L across 
interventions in the data generating process. The pattern of structural breaks in the 
regressions corresponding to the conditional and marginal distributions provides 
evidence of the underlying causal order. The causal inferences made are based on the 
structural stability of various conditional and marginal regressions.   
Previous evidences of an operative lending channel cited above have been 
hindered by problems of identification or strict assumption.  Their methodologies have 
problems in either elusive or restrictive argumentation.  For example, Perez and others 
have used the econometric model to derive a clear path of causality, but at the expense 
of too restrictive assumptions about the intervention in the generating process of bank 
loans and real income.  Such a method is not likely to be applied in cases that are more 
general.  Instead, my method is based on the statistical test and appropriate analysis of 
error correction model, and thus is more effective and general way to provide convincing 
empirical evidence of the existence of an operative bank lending channel.   
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Data 
Today it is taken for granted that monetary policy affects aggregate 
macroeconomic variables.  As the economic theory suggests, bank loans, interest rates 
and real output are indispensable components in the study of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, thus they are included in my model, and we can compare and contrast the 
interest channel and bank lending channel simultaneously.  The improvement of this 
study compared to previous empirical studies is that investment is added to my model to 
better understand how the lending channel takes effect.  Traditional macroeconomic 
theory suggests that the change of money will cause the investment shift and change the 
equilibrium output.  If it can be verified that the change of loans causes the change of 
investment and thus forces the change of real output, it will be very strong evidence for 
the existence of an operative lending channel.   
In summary, the data in this chapter focuses on quarterly observations of the real 
gross national product, commercial loans, 3-month T-bill rates and real investments 
from 1950:1–2003:3.  The real measures for GNP and investment are used to 
counterbalance the impact that other factors—such as inflation—have, and it will allow 
us to get more accurate estimates.  The data is from the website of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis.  All variables except three month treasure bill rate (which do not have 
significant seasonality) are seasonally adjusted and quarterly recorded with total 
observations of 215 on each series.  These variables chosen are populously used in 
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previous literature in exploring the bank lending channel, and may facilitate comparison 
across studies.   
The analysis is aggregate and all of the data are in the aggregated level.  
Industrial and commercial loans (LOAN) in all commercial banks are grouped to address 
the lending channel.  The 3-month T-bill rate is included to explore the traditional 
channel of monetary policy via interest rates.  This study selected the gross private 
domestic investment (INVESTMENT) to represent investments and this consists of 
fixed investment and change in private inventories.  Real GNP is used as proxy for real 
output level.  
 
Test for Long Run Structure Break and Isolate Sub-Samples 
As addressed above, this study considers advanced SUP-LM test for structure 
change of the long run equilibrium in the error correction model I investigated.  The test 
is new and unconventional, which allows us to explore the possible structure breaks in 
the Error Correction Model without many assumptions.  Specifically, this study tests 
structural change of the bank lending channel and interest rate channel across the whole 
period I have.   This study conducts the error correction model from 1950:Q1 to 
2003:Q3, all variables (GNP, LOAN, TBILL, INVEST) are included in level.  The 
stability of long-run relationships can be statistically assessed by testing the stability of 
the cointegrating vector and the adjustment vector in the error correction model.  It is 
assumed that the change point is known to lie between 1957:Q4 to 1995:Q2.  The 
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asymptotic critical values of adjustment vector (α ) has been found by Andrews (1993) 
and the distribution of cointegrating vector ( )β  was revised and updated by Seo (1998).   
 One step Schwarz Loss criterion (It will be explained in details in next section) 
picked 1 lag and model specification with no intercept or trend in cointegration equation 
or VAR for my error correction model (see Appendix A), the long-run relationship 
(cointegrating vector) and adjustment coefficient are estimates as: 
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Where t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 The detailed test hypothesis and procedures refer to Seo (1998).  All my tests are 
done in MATLAB, and they are replicable and available from the corresponding author.  
My tests reject the stability of the cointegrating vector β  and adjustment vector α  in 
two periods at the 10% size.  In Figure 2.1, SUP-LM statistics about β have a spike 
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reaching critical value of 12.98 in 1974, and all above the critical value after the second 
quarter of 1980. Thus cointegrating vector is not stable in these two points.  Figure 2.2 
shows that no break point for adjustment vector α , though there are two spikes around 
1981:Q4 and 1991: Q3, those statistics are not big enough to over critical value.  From 
Figure 2.3 I could find that the joint SUP-LM statistics share the same spine pattern with 
. Therefore, the critical values of the SUP-LM tests for joint stability 
largely depend on those of the stability of 
βLMSUP −
β .  In summary, SUP-LM tests clearly 
present two break points in the long run structure of economy: 1974:Q2 and 1980:Q2.  
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Figure 2.1.             βLMSUP −
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  Figure 2.2.  αLMSUP −
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Figure 2.3.  αβLMSUP −
 
 Consider the famous Romer and Romer date, they proposed six monetary policy 
shift in postwar period: Oct. 1947, Sep. 1955, Dec. 1968, Apr. 1974, Aug. 1978 and Oct. 
1979.  Then in their 1994 paper, they added the seventh: Dec. 1988.  The break dates are 
very close to two of them: Apr. 1974 and Oct. 1979, indicating the dramatic changes of 
economic structure in both long run and short run at these two points.  For the sake of 
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getting more accurate analyses, test results obtained here are combined with results 
Romer and Romer suggested, so that the stability of both long run and short run structure 
is guaranteed.  In this criterion, such break points are picked up in the data range: 1955: 
Q4, 1968:Q4, 1974:Q2, 1978:Q2, 1980:Q2, 1988:Q4. Thus this study isolates periods 
into two big sub-samples for my study: sub-sample I 1955:Q4 – 1968:Q3, sub-sample II 
1981:Q4 – 2003:Q3 (too many break points between 1968:Q4 to 1981:Q4 prevent us 
conducting an error correction model for sub-sample in this period due to the inefficient 
data).  1981:Q4 is chosen as the start of the second sub-sample instead of 1980:Q2, 
recall that the famous “Volker Experiment” period lasting from 1979 to the end of 1981, 
in which the Federal Reserve was experimenting with a nonborrowed reserve operating 
procedure and there is also a small spike in  around 1981: Q4 suggesting 
some change of adjustment vector in my error correction model.  It won’t hurt that I start 
prudently and a little bit postpone the start point. 
αLMSUP −
Notice that the date in 1988 are not included as the other break points in my 
model, though there was a significant change in the goals of policy in late 1988, after 
that the goal of reducing inflation became an important consideration, and the Fed began 
to appear willing to accept output losses in order to achieve the disinflation.  The reason 
is that my preliminary analysis on the pseudo sub-samples 1981:Q4 – 1988:Q3 and 
1988:Q4 – 2003:Q3 does show similar contemporaneous causal structure as well as the 
close impulse response pattern in the short run and long run.  Moreover, my SUP-LM 
test does not show significant break in the long run at this episode neither.  The possible 
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explanation is that the monetary policy shift at this time was not likely to cause the 
structure break in economy, and I believe the way monetary policy affect the economy 
keep unchanged since 1981.  Therefore I do not add this point to isolate the sub-samples.  
 The study here does make no claim that monetary policy shifts are the only 
source of structure break in economy here. For example, Hoover and Perez (1994) 
argued that the oil supply shocks might provide an alternative explanation of the output 
dynamics.  In response, Romer and Romer (1994) showed that the estimated impact of 
monetary policy shifts remains large and significant when oil shocks are controlled for.  
The more relevant question I concentrate is that if shifts of monetary policy will and in 
which way impact the output.  Thus the next section will focus on the analysis of error 
correction models and related impulse responses and seek to find any support to the 
existence of bank lending channel and/or interest channel. 
Error Correction Model and Directed Graph  
Preliminary plots of the data and formal tests on unit root in each sub-sample are 
applied.  Briefly, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root on each series (using 
the Augmented Dickey Fuller test) in each sub-sample.  Since these four series all have a 
unit root, it is possible that they have cointegration-like behavior.   
The common procedure recent studies have used to set up the error correction 
model (ECM) is to use either a trace test or information criterion to determine the lag 
order of the unrestricted VAR in the first step, and then use the same criterion to 
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determine the cointegration rank and appropriate specification for ECM in the second 
step.  This chapter, however,  will use a one step Schwart Loss Criterion (SLC) to 
determine the lag order and the cointegration vectors in the ECM simultaneously, which 
has been proven to work at least as well as or even better than the traditional trace test or 
two steps approach in both efficiency and consistency (Wang and Bessler, 2005).  Step 
by step, I check the Schwart Loss (SL) for each rank = 1, 2… and each model 
specification by lags and find the one that yields the lowest SL.  Because data set 
excludes the seasonality (GNP, LOAN and INVEST are seasonally adjusted numbers; I 
do not believe the three month T-bill rate will include any seasonality), 0 lag does not 
make sense in my case, and I start search from lag 1 to lag 2, 3…5.  (Detailed statistics 
are listed in Appendix B-C).   
Then I can conduct the Error Correction Model based on the test results.  It is 
well recognized that the individual coefficients of the Error Correction Model are 
difficult to interpret, which in turn make trouble in exploring the short run structure.  
Instead, innovation accounting may be the best form of studying the dynamic structure 
over the time.  (Sims, 1980; Lutkepohl and Reimers, 1992; Swanson and Granger, 1997).    
Accordingly, I report the lower triangular elements of the correlation matrix on 
innovations (errors) from the error correction model (see Tables 2.1and 2.2 below).  It is 
this matrix that provides the starting point for my analysis of contemporaneous causation 
using directed graphs.  By using TETRAD III, I get the directed graphs in Figures 2.4 
and 2.5 below.  The directed graphs are then helpful in identifying the contemporaneous 
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structure.  Once I have identified the order of contemporaneous innovations by using the 
direct graphs1, the next step is to check the impulse response associated with this error 
correction model in 32 periods (I believe that 8 year segments will cover both short-run 
and long-run responses) in Figures 2.6 and 2.7.  Below I will explain the models and 
results in 2 sub-samples individually.  
  
Table 2.1.  Correlation Matrix of Innovations (Errors) during Sub-Sample I  
(1955:Q4 – 1968:Q3) 
 
  GNPε  LOANε  TBILLε  INVESTε  
GNPε   1.000000    
LOANε   0.336957  1.000000   
TBILLε   0.322883  0.310929  1.000000   
INVESTε   0.848506  0.427487  0.232327  1.000000 
GNP: gross national output. 
LOAN: commercial loan. 
TBILL: 3 month T-bill rate. 
INVEST: total private investment. 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
1 We have unidentified variable in the contemporaneous structure, so we tried all possible orders given the 
specified structure from the directed graph in the Choleski ordering and obtained robust impulse response 
indicating that my impulse responses functions are appropriate. 
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Table 2.2.  Correlation Matrix of Innovations (errors) during Sub-Sample II 
(1981:Q4-2003:Q3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  GNPε  LOANε  TBILLε  INVESTε  
GNPε   1.000000    
LOANε   0.161546  1.000000   
TBILLε   0.166269  0.247677  1.000000   
INVESTε   0.688622  0.197987  0.257943  1.000000
GNP: gross national output. 
LOAN: commercial loan. 
TBILL: 3 month T-bill rate. 
INVEST: total private investment. 
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Figure 2.4.  Directed graph in sub-sample I (1955:Q4 – 1968:Q3) 
GNP: gross national output. 
LOAN: commercial loan. 
TBILL: 3 month T-bill rate. 
INVEST: total private investment. 
Note: o------o indicates unoriented links2. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
 
2 Here unoriented link in the directed graph may suggest the existence of latent variable which is the 
common cause of two variables in my system.  However, according to theory and literature, we cannot 
identify such a latent variable, and the currently used 4 variables system is maintained. 
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Figure 2.5.  Directed graph in sub-sample II (1981:Q4-2003: Q3) 
GNP: gross national output. 
LOAN: commercial loan. 
TBILL: 3 month T-bill rate. 
INVEST: total private investment. 
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Figure 2.6.  Impulse response functions in sub-sample I (1955:Q4 – 1968:Q3)   
GNP: gross national output. 
LOAN: commercial loan. 
TBILL: 3 month T-bill rate. 
INVEST: total private investment. 
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Figure 2.7.  Impulse response functions in sub-sample II (1981: Q4—2003: Q3) 
GNP: gross national output. 
LOAN: commercial loan. 
TBILL: 3 month T-bill rate. 
INVEST: total private investment. 
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Sub-sample I (1955:Q4 – 1968:Q3) 
The one step Schwarz Criterion indicates that the appropriate specification of the 
model assumes no deterministic trend in data, and no intercept or trend in the 
cointegrating equation (CE) or test VAR.  With the existence of cointegration, the data 
generating process of these series can be appropriately modeled in an ECM with 1 lag 
and 1 cointegration vector.   
The correlation matrix of innovations and the DAG results are reported in Table 
2.1 and Figure 2.1 individually.  From DAG, at a 20% significance level (I choose 20% 
significance level since the data points is smaller than 100), the innovations in GNP 
significantly contemporaneously cause innovations in TBILL, innovations in INVEST 
cause innovations in LOAN, innovations in LOAN and innovations in TBILL are 
bidirectional, and innovations in GNP has an unspecified link to innovations in INVEST.  
That is to say, interest rates was pretty sensitive to shocks of GNP and bank loans was 
pretty sensitive to innovations in INVEST in this period, while both interest rates and 
bank loans do not affect GNP in the current period, which is consistent with my 
assumption.  I could expect the bank loans or interest rates take the effect on output in a 
longer time, and the impulse response will check it out.  The Choleski-generated impulse 
responses reported here are based on the contemporaneous causal ordering figured out 
by DAG, actually the impulse responses are pretty robust to the alternatives which are 
based on the basic ordering addressed in DAG.   
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The impulse response next (See Figure 2.4) shows that a positive shock to LOAN 
yields a steadily increase in output.  A positive shock to TBILL rate will make very little 
effect on output and keep GNP stay at the base level.  A positive shock to INVEST will 
make GNP dramatically increase.  The fact that GNP responds more sensitively to the 
shock of LOAN than TBILL implies that the bank lending channel is the operative and 
dominant one at this period.  
I notice that INVEST acts as an accelerator for both bank lending channel and 
interest channel.  A positive shock to LOAN cause INVEST increase rapidly in the first 
3 quarters, and then stay in a slower rise, a positive shock to TBILL results in very little 
fall in INVEST, while positive innovations will make GNP go up continuously and 
significantly.  In fact, INVEST have bigger response to the shock of LOAN than to the 
shock of TBILL, and it is consistent with the movement patterns that innovations of 
LOAN and TBILL on GNP, it might be the evidence to support that investment actually 
is the intermediary mechanism through which bank lending channel and interest channel 
affect the economy.  
In summary, the impulse response summarized in this period appears to be 
consistent with a monetarist’s view in favor of bank lending channel: GNP show strong 
response to bank loans and investment in the short term and long term, while almost no 
response to interest rate.  The fact that shocks of bank loans make output go up through 
both itself and shocks on investment just suggests that the bank lending channel is the 
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key and operative component of monetary transmission mechanism in this period.  It is 
consistent with Perez’s study (1998) that the bank lending channel did exist in 1960s.   
Sub-sample II (1981:Q4-2003:Q3) 
The one step SLC procedure indicates that the appropriate specification is the  
model that assumes no linear trend in data, has an intercept (no trend) in CE and VAR.  
With the existence of cointegration, the data generating process of these series can be  
appropriately modeled in an ECM with one lag and one cointegration vector.   
The correlation matrix of innovations and the DAG results are reported in Table 
2.3 and Figure 2.3 individually.  From DAG, I see that the shock of INVEST and LOAN 
both significantly contemporaneously cause the change of TBILL at a 20% significance 
level.  That is to say, interest rates were very sensitive in this period and the extraneous 
shocks would be reflected in the fluctuation of interest rate firstly.  I could expect the 
interest rates being very active in transmission mechanism, and the impulse response 
will check it out.  The Choleski-generated impulse responses reported here are based on 
the contemporaneous causal ordering figured out by DAG: innovations in LOAN and 
INVEST cause innovations in TBILL, and the unspecified link between the innovations 
of GNP and INVEST.  Actually the impulse responses are pretty robust to the 
alternatives which are based on the basic ordering addressed in DAG.   
Figure 2.6 present the impulse response functions for this sub-sample.  A positive 
shock in LOAN results in very little increase in GNP in the first 5 quarters, and then 
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back to original level and keep unchanged after 20 quarters. Comparing these responses 
with the response of GNP to innovations in TBILL, I see different patterns, the GNP 
keep decreased to the positive shock of TBILL until the 20th quarter and then stay in a 
much lower level, suggesting that the interest channel might be a key component in 
monetary transmission in this period.  To study how INVEST and LOAN take the effects 
on interest channel, I find that a positive shock to GNP cause an increase in both 
INVEST and LOAN, then positive shocks to INVEST and LOAN make TBILL increase, 
finally  GNP decline to the positive shock of TBILL.  The response pattern here indicate 
that both INVEST and TBILL attenuate the effect of interest channel in the long run in 
this period, and it might explain why the response of GNP to positive shocks of TBILL 
eventually keep stable instead of continuously declining.  
Consider what was said by Volcker, the chairman of Fed, “Given that I am in the 
early stages, if I can put it that way, of any success in the face of very high interest rates 
despite the distortions in the economy and the very different impacts on different 
sectors—it seems to me that there is still a considerable danger, and maybe an overriding 
danger, of underkill rather than overkill…”  The U.S. entered a new era with an 
emphasis on controlling inflation.  Interest rates had been controlled and became the 
government’s strongest policy instrument in this period.  It was expected that the interest 
channel was the dominant monetary channel in this sub-sample, and the bank lending 
channel is losing its aggregated importance that has also been suggested by some other 
economist, i.e. Perez (1998).  However, I have shown that bank loans together with 
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investment still take the neutral effect on the economy by attenuating the effect of 
interest channel.  The effect of interest channel was easily overrated in this sense if 
decision makers could not realize the neutral effect in the long run caused by bank 
lending and investment and so rely more on interest rate control since the 1990s.  I have 
seen that falling interest rates in the 1990s did not work as well as in the 1980s, and 
more emphasis should be put on comprehensive understanding of these interactive 
channels and then make an appropriate design.  
Discussion and Policy Implication 
Ongoing changes in the banking industry have brought renewed attention to the 
role banks play in the monetary transmission mechanism.  In this chapter I validate the 
theory that an operative bank lending channel existed in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy in U.S. history.  The bank lending channel implies that the Federal 
Reserve exerts some control over real income by controlling the level of intermediated 
loans traded in the economy.  Independent of movements in interest rates, an increase in 
loans will raise aggregate output as bank-dependent firms have increased access to 
working capital. 
I find that monetary policy actions transmitted through various interrelated 
channels have a significant impact on real economic activity, monetary policy does 
matter.  But the bank lending channel appears to no longer be of aggregate importance 
currently (i.e. the expansion of commercial/industrial loans does not cause aggregate 
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output growth).  My error correction model and causality analysis do not provide 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that the lending channel is currently aggregately 
effective, while I do show that that bank loans together with investment still takes the 
neutral effect on the economy by attenuating the effect of interest channel.  .   
Some perspectives other than the factors I addressed above can be used to 
understand why a lending channel functioned outstandingly in the sub-sample I 
(1955:Q4 – 1968:Q3), but not recently.  Recall the two conditions for a bank lending 
channel to exist that I addressed in the beginning: (1) changes in policy affect the supply 
of bank loans and (2) some borrowers depend on banks for credit (Bernanke and Blinder 
1988).  With this in mind, it is easier to understand the shifting role of the bank lending 
channel.  One of the reasons for the existence of a lending channel in the 1960s is that 
there were a number of firms without alternative sources of investment funds at that time, 
thus the second condition was satisfied.  As Cecchetti pointed out, “…It [the lending 
channel] arises when there are firms who do not have equivalent alternative sources of 
investment funds and loans are imperfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios” (1994).  
The access to capital market, especially in the period marked as “new economy”, turns 
out to be easier, and more substitutes to traditional bank financing emerged.  Hence, I 
can expect the bank lending channel would not be as strong a policy tool for impacting 
the real economy as it was in 1960s.  Moreover, the first condition for a lending 
channel—that tight monetary policy reduces the bank loan supply—is more difficult to 
hold in current days.  Banks now have several alternatives to cutting their lending when 
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reserves decline; they could issue certificates of deposits (CDs) or other liabilities other 
than those that require reserves (Romer and Romer 1990).  
Another possible explanation is that lending has an asymmetric impact on the 
real economy; that is to say, the tightening of monetary policy will exacerbate the 
decline of the economy in the recession, although the ease of monetary policy won’t 
accelerate the development in the upswing.  If this is true, it can well explain why the 
lending channel seems less operative recently than in the famous period of “credit 
crunch” such as in the 1960s.  I am fairly confident that the contraction of monetary 
policy will cause a recession, but not vice versa.   
There is no strong evidence to support the existence of a bank lending channel 
recently.  On one hand, this might be due to the emergence of a great deal of financing 
substitutes.  On the other hand, it may be because of the relatively stable stance of 
monetary policy; the Federal Reserve has not enacted any dramatic tightening policies 
recently.  It will be a good topic for my future research to test whether or not there are 
asymmetric responses of real economy to positive and negative monetary innovations.  
In summary, the Federal Reserve can use explicit action, such as changing the 
base deposit rate to control loans supply, which will have a differential impact on the 
real economy that depends on time.  Though the bank lending channel seems no longer 
to be of aggregate importance, it does not imply that the bank lending channel is 
unimportant.  Bank lending channel nowadays still takes the important neutral effect on 
the economy by attenuating the effects that interest channel may perform.  A more 
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efficient policy design should include the neutral effect of bank lending channel, well 
recognizing interrelated response among bank loans, interest rate and investment.  
Moreover, bank lending still has structural effect on the real growth, because the change 
of bank loans supplied has differential effects on individual firms that are more or less 
dependent on bank credits.  If some firms cannot access credit market when monetary 
policy gets more tight, but other firms still have access to the contracted credit market, 
then some firms win and some firms lose when the stance of monetary policy changes.  
Therefore, the distribution of bank lending loans will have effects on economic growth, 
and how to efficiently allocate these bank loans should be my future research topic on 
the bank lending channel.  
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CHAPTER III  
STOCK RETURNS, MACRO POLICIES  
AND REAL ACTIVITY IN CHINA 
 
Introduction 
There is a common positive association between real activity and stock returns in 
both economic theory and, for most countries, this is also true in empirical situations.  
However, this relationship can be ambiguous, particularly in emerging market such as in 
China.  Recently China has boasted the world’s fastest growth rate in GDP, a stark 
contrast to the Chinese stock market that has been sluggish for several years.  I expect 
fluctuations in the stock market to be reflective of the macro economy.  The stock 
market is supposed to positively predict capital accumulation and real growth (Lee 1992, 
Levine and Zervos 1998).  In this sense, the stock market acts as an indicator for the 
economy as a whole.  Yet this relationship appears not to hold in modern China.  
Starting in 1996, the stock market cycle in China has shown an obvious deviation from 
the real business cycle.  When the real economy became sluggish, the stock market 
turned into a bull market, and when the economy started growing quickly after 2000, the 
Chinese stock market plunged into a bear market.  It is important to understand what is 
happening in the Chinese stock market that causes such a puzzling negative relationship 
 36
 
 
between the stock market and real GDP growth in China.  Moreover, it important to 
consider what effect it will have on the future economy.  
This chapter attempts to explain this anomalous stock return/real activity 
correlation by considering associated macro polices currently employed in China.  I 
believe that negative stock return/real activity correlation is not a causal relationship, but 
is instead induced by the relationship between stock returns and macro polices. These, in 
turn, are explained by factual implementation of macro policies in China and investors’ 
preferences.  
An outline of the remainder of this chapter is as follows.  Section 2 briefly 
introduces the Chinese stock market development.  Section 3 summarizes the previous 
literature on the Chinese stock markets.  In section 4 we provide the methodology and 
data details.  Section 5 provides results and discussion.  Finally, section 6 concludes and 
proposes future research. 
   
Chinese Stock Market Development 
China’s stock market is a relatively new—but increasingly important—part of 
the Chinese financial system, which is undergoing a structural shift from a heavily-
regulated and almost exclusively bank-based system to one with much greater diversity 
of institutions, including a vigorous and increasingly sophisticated stock market 
(Groenewold et al. 2003).  In 1991, the Shanghai stock exchange officially opened their 
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exchange to the public, and shortly thereafter the Shenzhen stock exchange began 
trading publicly.  
The Chinese stock markets primarily have two classes of shares: A shares and B 
shares.  A-shares were initially designated exclusively for domestic investors, while B-
shares were initially designated exclusively for foreign investors; these are also traded 
on the exchange board.  Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange trade both A 
and B shares, only difference is that B Shares listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange are 
listed in US dollars, while B Shares listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange are listed in 
Hong Kong dollars.  Additional classes of shares, namely “H” shares, are mainland 
company lists in Hong Kong and foreign markets.   
Since they began operation in the early 1990s, the two official stock markets in 
China have expanded dramatically and have become one of the leading equity markets.  
As of August 2005, 1380 firms (most of them being state-owned ones) had been listed 
with a market capitalization of about $420 billion (US dollars), among this around $409 
billion is listed in A shares, and $11 billion is listed in B shares (the numbers come from 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book).  It is the second largest stock 
market in Asia right now—second only to Japan.  It is speculated that within the coming 
decades China’s securities market has the potential to rank among the top four or five in 
the world (Ma and Folkerts-Landau, 2001), yet little is known about this relatively new 
market. 
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Despite its tremendous growth, the Chinese stock market may not be 
characterized by the depth and maturity of a stock exchange observed in a developed 
country.  Evidence of this is that in 2001 China’s market capitalization as a proportion of 
GDP was about 45%, while the corresponding figure for the US was over 300% 
(Demirer & Kutan, 2006).  Since 1996, the stock market has played an important role in 
China’s national economy; it was defined as a major source of refinancing in the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) sector. However, about two-thirds of outstanding shares are 
not publicly tradable which are exclusively A shares.  Currently, companies traded on 
Chinese exchanges still answer to large, powerful, public or semi-public organizations 
that have invested in them and private investors are likely to gain fewer rights than in 
Western nations.  Karmel (1994) writes: “This combination of public, semi-public and 
private management, with decentralized distribution of responsibilities, profits and 
rewards, is the defining characteristic of an emerging ‘capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics’ that sits above and complements the smallest private business.”  One of 
the biggest problems facing China’s stock market is a lack of transparency.  Reporting 
requirements for listed companies in China are not yet well developed and are 
significantly less comprehensive than those in the stock markets of industrial countries 
(Demirer & Kutan, 2006). 
The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets have collapsed since early summer 
2001, dropped by 40% with Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index ruuning from 
the record high 2245 points to currently 1346 points, at the same time China’s economy 
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experienced a golden period with high GDP growth around 8% per year.  Such puzzling 
association attracts much attention, and three questions rose immediately: 
1) Is the stock market really a signal of China’s economy?  
2) Is there any causality between stock returns and the real economy? 
3) How do we explain such a counter-theory phenomenon? 
This chapter uses a newly developed time series technique to apply quantitative 
analysis to these two questions and bears new evidence on the strange dilemma of 
China’s high economic growth rate accompanying a dismal stock market.  
 
Literature Review 
Existing empirical work on the Chinese stock market has focused on the studies 
under these categories: if it is an efficient market (Groenewold, Tang and Wu 2003, 
Seddighi and Nian 2004), if sub-markets (Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong) and 
different types of shares(A, B, and H shares) are co-integrated (Zhu, Lu and Wang 2004), 
identifying stock market regime shifts (Girardin and Liu 2003), modeling day-of-the-
week and holiday effects (Tsui and Yu 1999, Chen et al 2001), or explaining the large 
price difference between A and B shares in the Chinese stock market (Chung and Wei 
2005).   
China displays an important counterexample to the existing economic dogma that 
stock market should signal the real economy: the financial system, including the stock 
market, is very underdeveloped in efficiency and contribution (Allen et al. 2005), but 
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China has one of the largest and fastest growing economies in the world.  Little has been 
done to study this obvious contradiction to the conventional wisdom about the 
relationship between stock returns and real activity.  Only one recent paper has touched 
on this question:  Allen et al. (2005) points out that the law-finance-growth nexus 
applied to the State Sector and the List Sector with poor performance corresponds to the 
largely undeveloped law and financial system3. They assert that the private sector grows 
much faster than the other sectors because it is driven by other mechanisms (such as 
reputation, relationship, competition, etc.) and provides most of the economy’s growth.  
But they do not adequately explain why in recent years stock returns plunged even with 
the growth of the State Sector and List Sector although such growth is relatively low 
compared to private sector growth; moreover, their conclusion is based more on 
qualitative analysis , not quantitative modeling.  
I cannot locate the real reason by just observing the stock market cycles and real 
economy cycles; I believe it is reasonable to combine these two with respect to macro 
policies, particularly monetary policy and fiscal policy implemented during this period, 
to explain why such contradictory relationships appear.  
3 State Sector refers to all companies such that the government has ultimate control (state-owned 
enterprises); List Sector refers to all firms that are listed on an exchange and are publicly traded, which 
include both state sector and private sector.     
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Tobin’s well known general equilibrium theory of the financial sector (1969)  
suggests that both money growth and budget deficits may have significant impacts upon 
stock markets.  James, Koreisha, and Partch (1985) posit that stock returns signal both 
changes in real activity and changes in the monetary base.  Of course, whether or not 
fiscal and monetary policies do exert the theoretically postulated effects on stock market 
can only be resolved empirically. 
 In this study I will contribute to the existing literature and practices in these three 
aspects: first, I will analyze and forecast the interactions among selected macro variables; 
second, I will propose the reason for the puzzling relationship between stock returns and 
real activity and clarify its impact on China’s economic future; third, advise decision 
makers on future polices and practices in coordinating the stock market and real 
economy.  In the long run, the development of financial system including stock market 
liquidity should work along with real activity and provide better service for economic 
growth (Levince and Zervos 1998, Allen et al. 2005).  
 
Data and Methodology 
According to previous studies (Darrat 1988, Lee 1992, Ali and Hasan 1993, 
Dropsy and Nazarian-Ibrahimi 1994, Thorbecke 1997, Allen et al. 2005), my study 
should include the following variables covering various aspects of the economy: stock  
 42
 
 
                                                     
returns, monetary policy variable, fiscal policy variable, exchange rate policy variable, 
GDP or other production measurement, inflation index and interest rates4. 
I will use the consumer price index (CPI) as the proxy for inflation measure 
INF=(CPIt - CPIt-1) / CPIt-1.  I will use the Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index 
(COM) as a proxy for stock returns, since it is well recognized that the Shenzheng Stock 
Exchange moves in the same direction as the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Zhu et al. 2003). 
Moreover, the Shanghai Stock Exchange is dominant over the Shenzheng Stock 
Exchange in all aspects including capitalization, shares issued and capital raised.   I 
calculate the growth rate of stock returns, which is frequently used to measure the 
performance of the current Chinese stock market (Girardin and Liu 2003, Groenewold et 
al. 2003, Zhu et al. 2004, Demierer and Kutan 2006).  The formula is as follows: the 
stock return growth rate (SRG) = (COMt - COMt-1) / COMt-1.  The Shanghai Stock 
Exchange Composite Index takes December 19, 1990 as base day and the total market 
capitalization of all listed shares (including both A and B shares) on that day as base 
period.  The base period index is set as 100 points and has been officially published 
since July 15, 1991. 
4 Unemployment rate is not included due to the data availability. 
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I select the nominal narrow money supply (M1) growth as a proxy for monetary 
policy, and let MSG = (M1t – M1t-1) / M1t-1.  I choose monetary base growth rate 
instead of interest rates because the central bank of China (People’s Bank of China) 
generally exerts influence on real activity by controlling money supply but not interest 
rates. Interest rates have been stable over time.  In current China, interest rates are not 
completely marketable and efficient (Groenewold et al. 2003, Seddighi  and Nian 2004, 
Qin et al. 2005).  I don’t include a particular exchange rate policy proxy in my study, 
because the exchange rate policy is clearly targeted in monetary policy operations in 
China5 and was pegged to the US dollars until July 2005.  Such a unique monetary 
policy target also determined that the money supply, not the interest rates, was the most 
important intermediate target of policy committee to keep the stability of Renminbi 
(Chinese currency).  The growth rates of the national government budget deficit (BDG) 
are used as a proxy for fiscal policy, and computed by BDG = (BDt – BDt-1) / BDPt-1, 
here BD is the monthly budget deficit series. 
Growth of value added of industry (VAG) is used as a proxy for the GDP growth 
due to both theoretical and data availability reasons6. It is computed by monthly value 
added of industry (VAI) by VAG = (VAIt - VAIt-1) / VAIt-1. Value added of industry is 
5 The Ultimate objective of monetary policy is to maintain the stability of the Renminbi and thereby promote 
economic growth. – Cite from the Peoples’ Bank of China website.  
6 Generally we should use GDP to measure the real output, but only the quarterly GDP data for China are 
available, while value added of industry has a very high correlation with GDP, my preliminary correlation 
test shows value added of industry is highly correlated with detrend GDP.  
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the difference between the total output value of production and the value of consumption 
and transfer of material products and service during production. 
I conduct study from 1996 to the current period in China.  This choice follows 
two considerations.  First, a famous counter stock market cycle against real economic 
cycle has occurred since 1996, and I am more interested in the combined analysis of 
stock market and real economy during this period.  Second, before 1996, trading was not 
very active and information disclosure requirements were rather poor.  Since 1996, the 
Chinese stock market has been more formal.   
Note that the period from April to December 1996 was characterized by intense 
speculative pressure; over-speculation started to prevail and became increasingly 
rampant.  This led the government to take measures to calm down the stock market.   
December 16, 1996 became well known as the ‘Black Monday’ of China’s stock market 
because the Shanghai stock exchange reacted with sharp drops in prices : 10% on  
December 16th, nearly 8% on the 17th, and 10% on the 18th of December (Giradin and 
Liu 2003).  I will skip this period to avoid possible structural changes, and choose the 
period from Jan. 1997 to Aug. 2005 as my study sample.   
In summary, five variables which will be included in my study are: the growth 
rate of stock returns (SRG), the growth rate of money supply (MSG), the growth rate of 
government budget deficit (BDG), the inflation index (INF), and the growth rate of 
value added of Industry (VAG).  I will use nominal monthly data running from Jan. 1997 
to Aug. 2005.  Monthly data is preferred to quarterly data, particularly when analyzing 
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the stock market in which prices are determined on a daily basis7.  With monthly date, I 
get plenty of observations and avoid degrees of freedom problems.  All of my data come 
from the data company CEIC.  These are nominal and unadjusted series.  The variables 
SRG, MSG, INF and BDG will be seasonally adjusted.  The adjusted series are plotted 
in Figure 3.1 to help have a preliminary view of series trend particularly the correlations 
among stock returns, value added in industry and macro policies.  
Previous studies (Darrat 1988, Ali and Hasan 1993, Chatrath et al. 1996, 
Thorbecke 1997, and Allen et al. 2005) employ one-step or two-step regression methods 
to explore the interactions among stock returns, macro policies, and output.  As pointed 
out by Darrat that: “…the measurement errors, model misspecifications, or any other 
estimation problems are responsible for the inefficiency evidence… the reason for the 
inefficiency may lie instead in some inadequacy of the model…”. 
 
 
7 Daily data on certain macro series like GDP, value added of industry, money supply or budget deficit are 
not available. 
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Figure 3.1. Data plot for SRG, VAG, MSG, INF and BDG after seasonal 
adjustment 
Vertical axis for each series except BDG is measured with % index. 
Horizontal axis is measured with time.   
SRG: the growth rate of stock returns. 
VAG: the growth rate of value added in industry. 
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Figure 3.1. Continued 
ING: the growth rate of inflation. 
MSG: the growth rate of money supply. 
BDG: the budget deficit, measured with unit million Renminbi (Chinese Currency). 
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Faced with these inefficiencies and the absence of the knowledge about the 
“true” model, the vector autoregression (VAR) technique appears appropriate in this 
context to empirically study the stock market with respect to other macro series.  VAR 
methodology has proven useful for investigating the relationship between stock returns 
and other macro variables (Lee 1992; Ali and Hasan 1993). 
Formal tests on the unit root to each series are applied.  Briefly, I reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root on SRG, INF, BDG, and fail to reject the null hypothesis on 
VAG and MSG (using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test).  Since there are two series 
with unit root, it is possible that they are cointegrated, thus I conduct an error correction 
model in this study. 
I use recently proposed development of VAR - error correction model (ECM) 
combined with directed graphs (Swanson and Granger 1997, Spirtes et al. 2000,  Pearl 
2000, Bessler and Yang 2003) to study the negative relationship between stock returns 
and value of added in industry with controlling the impact that macro policies have on 
this relationship.  ECM is a reduced form method that doesn’t require any priori 
restrictions on the model.  Directed graphs will allow us to identify the contemporaneous 
order of variables and thus provide more accurate impulse response analysis.  These 
modeling procedures enable us to obtain deeper insights into the dynamic interactions of 
these series.  
Basically, I use the error correction model combined with directed graphs to 
show the contemporaneous causality structure on innovations and analyze the short-run 
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and long-run interactions and causalities among variables based on an impulse response 
function.  In this chapter, directed graphs are used to help in providing data-based 
evidence on causal ordering in contemporaneous time, assuming the information set is 
causally sufficient8.  Causal inference on directed graphs (DAGs) has recently been 
developed by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (2000), and Pearl (2000).  This method is 
able to shed light on contemporaneous relationships.  The directed graphs literature is an 
attempt to infer causal relationships from observational data.  The key idea is to use a 
statistical measure of independence, commonly a measure of conditional correlation, to 
systematically check the patterns of conditional independence and dependence and to 
work backwards to the class of admissible causal structures (Hoover, 2005).  Results 
indicate that achieving model identification through the use of direct acyclic graphs can 
yield plausible and theoretically consistent impulse response functions that can be used 
in policy analysis (Awokuse and Bessler 2003). 
Moreover, the error correction model will allow us to identify the long-run and 
short-run time structure of the series, thereby clearly showing the relationship among 
stock returns, macro policies, and real activity.  
 
8 Causally sufficiency means there is no latent variable that causes two included variables in the study, see 
Sprites et al. 1993.  
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Results and Discussion 
Before discussing the Error Correction model analysis, I briefly summarize  
empirical contemporaneous cross correlations among variables (Table 3.1) for the period 
of January 1997 to the period of August 2005, and I find:  
 
Table 3.1. Cross Correlations among Variables SRG, VAG, INF, MSG, BDG 
  SRG VAG INF MSG BDG 
SRG 1     
VAG -0.08631 1    
INF 0.09964 -0.3834 1   
MSG 0.06403 -0.0129 -0.0491 1  
BDG -0.02423 -0.0217 0.02179 -0.0565 1 
 
SRG: the growth rate of stock returns. 
VAG: the growth rate of value added in industry. 
INF: the inflation rate. 
MSG: the growth rate of money supply. 
BDG: the budget deficit. 
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1. Stock returns are negatively correlated with VAG growth, contrary to the general 
assumption that the stock market rationally signals changes in real activity. 
2. Contrary to the common negative association between stock return and inflation in 
developed countries like the US (Fama 1981, Stulz 1986) during the post-war period, 
stock returns and inflation are weakly positively correlated in China, which is 
consistent with theoretical assumptions that common stock should be a hedge against 
inflation.   
3. Inflation is negatively associated with nominal GDP growth, which is consistent 
with most other empirical relationships in developed countries. 
4. Change in money supply and budget deficit are correlated with stock returns, real 
activity and inflation in expected direction. 
This chapter will focus more on the correlation of stock market return versus 
economic activities.  Preliminary plots of the data and formal tests on the unit root are 
applied to each variable.  Briefly, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root on 
VAG and MSG (using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test).  It is possible that they are 
co-integrated, and so I can model it with error correction model.    
The common procedure in previous studies to set up the error correction model 
(ECM) is to use either a trace test or information criterion to determine the lag order of 
the unrestricted VAR in the first step, and then use the same criterion to determine the 
co-integration rank and appropriate specification for ECM in the second step.  In this 
chapter, however, I will use a one step Schwartz Loss Criterion (SLC) to determine the 
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lag order and the co-integration vectors in the ECM simultaneously, which has been 
proven to work at least as well as or better in both efficiency and consistency than both 
the traditional trace test and the two-step approach (Wang and Bessler, 2004).   
Step by step, I check the Schwart Loss (SL) for each rank = 1, 2… and each 
model specification by lags and find the one that yields the lowest SL.  Because my data 
set has been adjusted for seasonality, 0 lag is not appropriate, and I start search from lag 
1 and continue to lag 12 (Detailed statistics are listed in Appendix D).  I then apply a 
one-step Schwarz Loss criterion that identifies 1 lags, two cointegrating vectors, and 
model specifications with no deterministic trend in data, intercept (no trend) in CE, but 
no intercept in VAR.  I report both parameter estimates and associated t-statistics in the 
Appendix E. 
 In terms of the long-run relations (the parameter matrix associated with levels 
lagged one period), the matrix of parameter can be written as 'αβπ =  where α  is a 
 matrix and 25× 'β is a  matrix, since I have two cointegrating vectors.  The long-
run component of the error correction representation is given as 
52×
'β , the speed 
adjustment of each series to perturbations in the long-run component ( 'β ) is given by 
the α  matrix.  
 I further conduct some exploratory tests on the long-run structure of 
interdependence among variables.  One hypothesis which I am extremely interested is 
whether one of cointegrating vector ( 'β ) could explain the puzzling relationship 
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between stock returns and real economy when considering associated macro policies.   
Thus I consider over-identified restrictions on each vector of 'β .  Suppose 'β  is the 
matrix represented as:  
(3.1) β =  ,  ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
2524232221
1514131211
βββββ
βββββ
,,,,
,,,,
and I have: 
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where φ  is unknown coefficients.  Under the null hypothesis that these restrictions are 
“true”, I apply the LR tests for binding restrictions, and have p-value 0.4418, suggesting 
that I should accept the null hypothesis and these restrictions are consistent with the data.  
One of my identified  β  matrixes is listed as the following: 
                                                     
 
 
9 We test other forms of the design of β , in particular a restriction between stock return and monetary 
policy in the form of 
21β =0, 22β =1, 23β =0,  and we reject those restrictions at a p-value of .05.  
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(3.4)   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=
0        36.00     41.57-      1               0  
1     2252.68    197.38-     0   1245.60- β
The second row shows stock return is negatively related to money supply, and 
positively related to inflation.  The negative sign is opposite to the common sense that 
expansionary monetary policy should drive up the stock market.  The effect of real 
output and fiscal policy on stock return in the long run could be dismissed.  The first row 
reflects that the value added of industry (VAG) is positively related to money supply and 
budget deficit and negatively related to inflation.    
 In the next step, I explore the possibility that some series do not respond to 
perturbations in the cointegration vector.  Here I am interested in the weak exogeneity of 
each series, relatively to the long-run equilibrium (see Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon 
(1998) for a formal discussion on weak exogeneity).  The null hypothesis is that each 
variable does not make adjustment toward the estimated long run relation.  From the test 
statistics reported in Table 3.2 below, I find that I cannot reject the null hypothesis for 
stock return (SRG) and fiscal policy (BDG), indicating that both stock return and fiscal 
policy do not respond to perturbations in two long run relations.  The weakly exogeneity 
of SRG points out that the correlation between stock returns and real economy at least is 
not a causality relation and it must be induced by other relevant relations. 
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Table 3.2. Test of Weak Exogeneity of Each Series (Given Two  
Cointegration Vectors) 
 
Series chi-square p-value Decision 
VAG 34.4116 0.0000  R 
SRG 2.987 0.3936  F 
INF 22.5023 0.0000  R 
MSG 24.3257 0.0000  R 
BDG 2.3189 0.5089  F 
 
Note: Imposing simultaneous over identifying restrictions on β at the same time.  
 
Thus far I discussed on tests revealed long-run relationships, next I turn to 
contemporaneous relationships and short-run as well as long-run relationships obtained 
from impulse response.  It is well recognized that the individual coefficients of the error 
correction model are difficult to interpret, which in turn makes it difficult to explain the 
short-run and long-run structure.  Instead, innovation accounting may be the best form of 
studying the dynamic structure over the time (Sims, 1980; Swanson and Granger, 1997).   
Before reporting the impulse response function, I explain precisely it means.  As 
discussed in Hamilton (1994), a common, but technically unsound, interpretation of an 
impulse-response function is the effect of a primitive impulse on variable Yj,t+k.  A more 
technically accurate interpretation of an impulse-response function is the revision in the 
conditional forecast of some variable Yj,t+k given a past shock to some other variables Yi,t.  
Sims (1980) and others have noted that when there is contemporaneous correlation 
among variables, the choice of ordering in the Choleski decomposition, which is the 
base of an impulse response derivation, may make a significant difference for 
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interpretation of impulse responses. I use directed graphs as an alternative to the widely 
used Choleski factorization of contemporaneous correlation to determine the Choleski 
ordering required in the impulse response; such applications of directed graphs in 
finance and economic studies are now common (Awokuse and Bessler 2003, Bessler and 
Yang 2003, Kalai 2003, Yang et al. 2006) 
I report the lower triangular elements of the correlation matrix on innovations 
(errors) from the error correction model in Table 3.3.  This matrix provides the starting 
point for my analysis of contemporaneous causation using directed graphs.  By using 
TETRAD III, I get the directed graphs in Figure 3.2.  Using DAG at a 10%10 
significance level, I find the innovations in MSG (growth of money supply) significantly 
contemporaneously cause innovations in VAG (growth of value added of industry), and 
then innovations in VAG cause innovations in INF (growth of inflation) 
contemporaneously.  I also find that the innovations in SRG (growth of stock returns) 
contemporaneously cause innovations in INF.  This makes sense because monetary 
policy can be more effective in the short-run according to classical theory, and inflation 
is sensitive to fluctuations of real output and stock returns which I also expect according 
to general money demand and supply theory.  After identifying the order of 
10 A 10% significance level is chosen since my data is not large between 100 and 200.  
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contemporaneous innovations;11 I check the impulse response of variables in 40 periods 
segments to cover both short-run and long-run interactions.  
 
Table 3.3.  Correlation Matrix of Innovations (Errors) on SRG, VAG, INF,  
MSG, BDG 
 
  SRG VAG INF MSG BDG 
SRG 1     
VAG -0.07478 1    
INF 0.224476 -0.23012 1   
MSG -0.09513 0.184795 -0.041 1  
BDG -0.01553 -0.00983 -0.02132 -0.11886 1 
 
SRG: the growth rate of stock returns. 
VAG: the growth rate of value added in industry. 
INF: the inflation rate. 
MSG: the growth rate of money supply. 
BDG: the budget deficit. 
 
                                                     
11 BDG (growth of budget deficit) has not entered my identified contemporaneous structure, so I tried all 
possible orders for BDG in the Choleski ordering and obtained quite robust impulse response indicating 
that the order of BDG in the Choleski ordering does not matter. 
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Figure 3.2. Directed graph on SRG, VAG, INF, MSG, BDG 
SRG: the growth rate of stock returns. 
VAG: the growth rate of value added in industry. 
INF: the inflation rate. 
MSG: the growth rate of money supply. 
BDG: the budget deficit. 
 
 
To investigate the puzzling relationship between SRG and VAG, I first check 
there impulse response to all unanticipated shocks of the other variables (Figures 3.3 and 
3.4).  As shown in Figure 3.3, positive output innovations have an almost immediate, but 
slight effect on stock returns in the first 5 periods, and then quickly return to unchanged 
in the remaining periods.  Stock returns respond positively and consistently to shocks of 
inflation, and swing in a narrowband to shocks of budget deficit in the first 30 periods 
and thereafter return to normal levels.  Unanticipated expansionary fiscal policy do not 
exhibit a consistent influence on stock markets, which is consistent with a previous  
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Figure 3.3. Impulse response of SRG to shocks of all other variables in 40 periods12
 
SRG: the growth rate of stock returns. 
VAG: the growth rate of value added in industry. 
INF: the inflation rate. 
MSG: the growth rate of money supply. 
BDG: the budget deficit. 
                                                     
 
 
12 The vertical axis in all of impulse responses in this chapter are measured with % growth rate.   
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study on 11 industrialized countries conducted by Dropsy and Nazarian-Ibrahimi (1994).  
However, stock returns respond negatively and significantly to shocks of money supply.    
As shown by Figure 3.4, output has little response or even negative response to 
stock returns innovations, and had positive response to money shocks.  Inflation results 
in an initial positive response by output in less than 1 year and then sustains that level.  
It is easy to understand that expansion of monetary policy will stimulate the real 
economy, at least in the short-run.  Moderate inflation boosting the economy can also be 
explained since the Chinese are likely to consume and invest more to hedge against 
inflation expectations and thus provide stimulus for the economy.  Output responds 
inversely to positive shocks of fiscal policy in the first 30 periods, and then stays at that 
positive level indicating that fiscal policy does not effective the current economy in 
China.  Continuous budget deficit expansion might hurt the Chinese economy in the long 
run.  
We see that a positive shock to monetary supply will cause an increase in output 
but a decrease in stock returns.  In order to check if monetary supply has a strong and 
persistent impact on stock returns and output, I need to explore how money supply 
responds to shocks of stock returns and output (see Figure 3.5).  In Figure 3.4, 
innovations in stock returns have no effect on the money supply, and innovations in 
output have little positive effect on the money supply.  This indicates a money-output bi-
directional association.  Considering that money supply has no response to stock returns,  
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Figure 3.4. Impulse response of VAG to shocks of all other variables in 40 periods 
 
SRG: the growth rate of stock returns. 
VAG: the growth rate of value added in industry. 
INF: the inflation rate. 
MSG: the growth rate of money supply. 
BDG: the budget deficit. 
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Figure 3.5. Impulse response of MSG to shocks of SRG and VAG in 40 periods 
 
SRG: the growth rate of stock returns. 
VAG: the growth rate of value added in industry. 
INF: the inflation rate. 
MSG: the growth rate of money supply. 
BDG: the budget deficit. 
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while stock returns negatively respond to the positive shock of money supply, and stock 
returns and output have no direct response to each other, I conclude that in the Chinese 
stock market money supply expansion causes a decrease in the stock return in the short 
and long run.  The puzzling negative relationship between stock returns and real activity 
in China is a proxy for the negative link between monetary policy and stock returns 
when expansion of monetary policy causes an increase in real output.   
I propose that one of the reasons that the expansion of monetary policy adversely 
affects the stock market is that the real estate market absorbed more capital than that of 
stock market during the period of loose monetary policy.  When the money supply 
increases, the available total investment capital rises.  I could clearly divide such 
investment into two categories: tangible investment such as in real estate market, 
equipment, etc., and equity investment such as in stocks, bonds, and the futures market.  
In the current Chinese capital market, investors obviously have fewer alternatives than in 
industrial countries. Of the limited options available, investing in real estate is a good 
choice, particularly since it has been such a hot market.   Recognizing these key factors, 
it makes sense that when monetary policy expands and increases available credit from 
banks, loans become more readily available for all sectors, including the real estate 
industry.  Investment in real estate is heavily dependent on bank lending since other 
external financing is thus far significantly underdeveloped in China.  Consequently, 
large sums of funds were transferred from the stock market into the real estate market, as 
see in Figure 3.6.  
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Figure 3.6.  The comparison of total investment to real estate sector and stock 
market in China. 
Unit: Million Renminbi (Chinese currency)  
Data source: China National Bureau of Statistics, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Fact Book 
and Shanghai Stock Exchange Fact Book. 
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The growth rate of real estate loans has been far above the average growth rate of 
total domestic loans since June 2001 (China Real Estate Financial Report 2004), and 
China’s vigorous housing market has absorbed a large percentage of available 
investment capital.  Thus, money pulled out of stocks is finding its way into real estate.   
Another important reason might be that the expansion of monetary policy is not 
easily transmitted to corporate firms.  For most of the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
in China, they are still greatly dependent on state owned banks for external financing.  
Such loan contracts are often set up for long time periods and cannot be adjusted 
sensitively and efficiently to changes in the money base.  The corporate earnings for 
those SOEs have been unstable for a long time and not prompted by monetary policy 
change. As pointed out in the 2002 monetary report by the state development research 
center “…for SOEs, their contribution to GDP growth rate is around 30%, to economic 
development is less than 20%...Instead, the non state owned economy has accounted for 
70% of total GDP, and 100% of growth in employment.” (Resource: 
TUhttp://www.drcnet.com.cnUT)  Considering the possibility of overestimation for 
public number (Fang 2000), the actual contribution ratio of SOEs to growth would be 
even less. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined the contradictory relationship between stock 
returns and real activity in China by using impulse response analysis based on directed 
graphs and an error correction model.  I conclude that the contradiction is not because of 
a causal relationship between stock returns and real activity, but because of the negative 
relationship between stock returns and monetary policy. The expansion of money supply 
causes an increase in output but a decrease in stock returns.  The impact of monetary 
policy on output and stock returns induces the puzzling relationship between stock 
returns and real activity.  I suppose that the negative relationship between monetary 
expansion and stock returns is due to the overheating real estate market attracting 
intensive capital investment and the fact that the expansion of monetary policy has not 
be transmitted efficiently to state-owned enterprises which are the predominantly listed 
companies in the Chinese stock market.  This is in my future research agenda and I 
expect to find out more evidence to support it.     
In some sense, the stock returns signal one of the important indictors of 
economic activity in China: the unemployment rate.  Though it is not an officially public 
number, it is widely speculated that the unemployment rate has kept rising in the years 
accompanied with the sluggish stock market.  The most unemployment in China comes 
from the state-owned sector which is also the principal part of stock market, thus there is 
a strong link between stock market and unemployment rate.  According to Professor and 
economist Xiao Zuoji’s opinion, the actual unemployment rate for urban population is 
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about 15% - 20%, which does not include the possible billion unemployed laborers in 
rural areas.  Not surprisingly, China might have the world’s highest unemployment rate. 
(2003 United Morning Daily, Beijing). The other abnormal phenomenon in China 
economy is that the coexistence of high growth rate of GDP and unemployment, which 
is the other interesting topic.  The puzzling relationship I study in this chapter is highly 
correlated to such phenomenon.  I have to recognize that currently the rising 
unemployment rate is concomitant with fast GDP growth in China, and it is not good for 
development in the long run.  The high unemployment rate primarily in urban areas is 
due to poor performance of state-owned sector, therefore the slumped stock market is a 
constant reminder of the importance for China’s government to face and solve the 
problem of high unemployment even during periods of fast GDP growth.  
In terms of the relationship between stock returns and fiscal policy, both my 
long-run tests and impulse response show that the stock returns have very little response 
to changes in fiscal policy.  The similar result could be found in the literature, i.e., Ali 
and Hasan’s study (1993) in Canada.   
My analysis confirms that the Chinese stock market has a restricted effect on the 
whole economy, because the stock returns are proxy for only a fraction of the whole 
economy—state owned enterprises, in particular. The effect is more on downside.  As 
pointed out by Green and Ho in 2004 “The lack of a real threat of de-listing still 
undermines corporate governance on China’s exchanges.”  In essence, the inefficiencies 
in the Chinese stock markets could be attributed to poor and ineffective regulation.  To 
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change the negative relationship between stock returns and real activity, the Chinese 
government should adjust the institution and allow more private firms to be listed as 
well as allowing more SOE shares to be traded on the board.  By doing so, the Chinese 
stock market could be expected to be more efficient and competitive compared to other 
capital markets and become a real indicator of the economy as a whole.  
Because Chinese currency, Renminbi, was firmly pegged to the US dollar in the 
study sample, one may expect that the change in US dollar value would exert some 
impact on the Chinese money market; future research may analyze how stock returns 
fluctuate with respect to changes in the US dollar exchange rate.  In addition, the impact 
of the real estate market volatility requires further scrutiny.  Another interesting 
phenomenon worthy of attention in China is the positive relationship between inflation 
and stock returns, which requires more explanation and analysis in future research.    
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CHAPTER IV 
CREDIT CHANNEL AND EFFICIENCY IN THE PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE SECTORS OF CHINA 
 
Introduction 
The role monetary policy has on the real economy, and the means by which 
monetary policy affects the economy, remains an open question in macroeconomics for 
decades.  Economic theory suggests several possible channels through which monetary 
policy can affect the real economy, for example, money channel and credit channel. 
Traditional money channel places emphasis on the money, attributing all of the forces of 
monetary policy to the shift of money supply, which changes the interest rate and 
spending.  The key assumption here is a perfect financial market; all funds are assumed 
perfect substitutes.  If information problems occur, preventing firms from substituting 
easily among alternate sources of funds; two other possible channels take effect: credit 
channel and exchange rate channel.    
While the traditional money channel works in a perfect economic environment 
assuming a closed economy, the credit channel hinges on the assumption of an imperfect 
financial market. The credit channel has gained great interest within the last decade 
(Bernanke and Blinder 1992, Kashyap and Stein. 1994, Romer and Romer 1994, 
Kierzenkowski 2005).  Given market imperfection, monetary policy has the potential to 
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affect not only credit demand by affecting the willingness to consume or invest, but also 
credit supply by changing the supply of bank loans as well as other external finance.   
In an open economy, exchange rate channel posits that monetary policy affects 
net export through the impact of the interest rate on the exchange rate. Higher interest 
rates mean stronger currency, and strong currency leads to a decline in net export 
demand and output (Leitemo et al 2002). 
There are two sub-channels of credit channel generally discussed in literature: 
bank lending channel and balance sheet channel.  Kashyap and Stein (1994) define the 
bank lending channel as follows: “…monetary policy can work not only through its 
impact on the bond-market rate of interest, but also through its independent impact on 
the supply of intermediated loans…”  The bank lending channel implies that the central 
bank can influence real income by controlling the level of intermediated loans.  The 
balance sheet channel takes effect from either the demand or supply side.  An increase in 
liquidity lowers interest rates and pushes people to transform their excess liquidity into 
investment or consumption, and thus provides better returns.  On the other hand, when 
interest rate increases lead to a reduction in the value of different assets that could be 
used as collateral by borrowers, the borrower’s balance sheet becomes worse.  Then a 
restrictive monetary policy has the potential to lower the available credit due to lower 
quality loan collateral (Hulsewig et al 2004).  Interest rates are the major policy tool in 
the balance sheet channel, thus it can also be called the interest channel.   
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The existence and efficiency of credit channel have important policy implications.  
Many studies have searched for empirical evidence of credit channels (Bernake and 
Blinder 1992, Gertler and Gilchrist 1994, Kashyap and Stein 1994, 2000, Oliner and 
Rudebusch 1996, Perez 1998).  However, most recent studies focus on developed 
countries such as in the U.S., and have no reference to China.  Since the late 90s, 
especially accompanied with financial crisis in south-eastern Asia, China consecutively 
executed the stable monetary policy in order to prevent a crisis.  Such policy was 
expected to loose money and stimulate the economy, though its effect is not clear.  
Under this background, the efficiency of monetary policy in China as well as the 
transmission mechanism becomes the more important question and is getting more 
attention.  
Besides these two generally acknowledged credit channels, the exchange rate 
channel as one of credit channels was also proposed recently.  The exchange rate 
channel states that in an open economy monetary policy affects net export through the 
impact of the interest rate on the exchange rate.  Higher interest rate mean stronger 
currency and stronger currency leads to a decline in net export demand and output.  The 
empirical evidence on the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates is still very 
mixed because the response of exchange rates to monetary policy is notoriously hard to 
predict (Anegeloni et al. 2003).  In China, the exchange rate channel is not considered 
operative.  China economy is still not an absolutely open economy, and the fixed 
exchange rates are still under the strict control of the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the 
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central bank.  Adjustments to these rates occur very infrequently as shown in Figure 4.1.  
Beginning July 2005, PBC announced they would scrap the yuan's decade-old peg to the 
U.S. dollar, and phase in a managed floating exchange rate system.  A long time fixed 
exchange rate regime in China limits the effects of the exchange rate channel of 
monetary transmission, which is consistent with basic open economy assumption, and it 
has been in agenda to set up a more flexible exchange rate policy in the long run.     
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Figure 4.1. China foreign exchange trade system (CFETS) spot exchange rate 
Monthly Average Mar. 1995 – Jul. 2005  
Vertical Axis Unit: Renminbi. 
RMB: Chinese currency. 
USD: United States currency dollar. 
HKD: Hong Kong currency dollar. 
JPY: Japanese currency yen. 
Source: CEIC China Database. 
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The monetary transmission channels addressed above can be illustrated as Figure 
4.2: 
 
 
 Monetary Policy 
Perfect Market 
Money Channel 
Bank Lending  
Channel 
Interest 
Channel 
Exchange Rate 
Channel 
Credit Channel 
Imperfect Market 
 Figure 4.2. Monetary transmission channels 
 
There possible exist some other sub-channels of credit channel in the monetary 
transmission that may be important to China. For example, Yuan and Zimmermann 
(1999) proposed the importance of firm heterogeneity as a channel of transmission for 
monetary policy.  They believe the capital structure of firms changes endogenously over 
time as a result of their financial decisions as well as self regulation of banks in 
determining the allocation of money from deposits to selected types of loans. Such 
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heterogeneity may significantly amplify both real and nominal shocks to the economy.  
They also report that monetary policy can do little to ease a credit crunch that arises 
because of increasing loan risk However, more flexible loan regulations, in particular, 
rules that allow the banks to take more risks that are compensated by higher loan rates, is 
very effective. 
This study will focus on the roles of two major credit channels including both 
bank lending channel and interest channel (balance sheet channel), in the monetary 
transmission of China.  Generally, we expect that industries that use external finance 
will grow relatively faster during the period of monetary expansion (Rajan and Aingales 
1998).  It is widely acknowledged that in China, during the last decade, the private 
sector being more dependent on external finance than public sector has been the most 
dynamic component in the Chinese economy, and it has become a powerful engine for 
China’s economy growth (Guillaumont Jeanneney, et al 2006).  The Chapter III about 
stock market and monetary policy in China argues that the monetary policy may have 
been transmitted less efficiently to the public sector than to the private sector, and I will 
investigate this assumption in this study.   
The purpose of this chapter is therefore, (1) to test for the existence of credit 
channel in China monetary transmission, and (2) to examine if monetary policy has been 
transmitted with the same efficiency to the different sectors of China.    
The rest of chapter proceeds as follows: Section 2 addresses the methodology 
adopted.  Section 3 briefly describes the data.  Section 4 presents the ECM and the 
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estimated long-term cointegration relationships that allow for a loan demand and supply 
interpretation. Section 5 addresses the directed graph and impulse response that identify 
the contemporaneous and short-run dynamics.  Section 6 discusses the results of the 
above sections and concludes the chapter.  
 
Methodology 
Most empirical studies about credit channel concentrate on bank lending channel 
by using aggregate time series data (Bernanke and Blinder 1992, Perez 1998, Hulsewig 
et al 2004).  Many studies established that bank loans and economic activity fall 
significantly after a monetary contraction, which is consistent with the credit channel.  
However, a severe identification problem occurs because it is very hard to reveal 
whether the cut off in bank loans is driven by loan supply or by loan demand “It is not 
possible using reduced-form estimates based on aggregate data alone, to identify 
whether bank balance sheet contractions are caused by shifts in loan supply or loan 
demand” (Cecchetti 1995).  Thus, many researchers turn to the bank level and firm level 
data to study the individual borrower’s reactions. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap 
and Stein (1994, 2000), and Olinear and Rudebusch (1995) use large numbers of 
disaggregated panel data to identify loan supply effects. However, using micro data has 
its own problems.  One of the most serious problems is that it does not indicate how 
important this channel is on a macroeconomic scale.   
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This study uses macro-aggregated data and complements the existing empirical 
literature.  The time series analysis of China macro data is analyzed using an error 
correction model (ECM) and directed graph suggested by Swanson and Granger (1997), 
and Bessler and Yang (2003).  The ECM approach does not require a specific functional 
form or assumed knowledge about the variables, and is better in dealing with macro 
variables when the true relations among these variables are extremely hard to know.  
Thereby the ECM is of great importance and particular advantage in policy analysis, 
especially for developing countries such as China.  My time series model includes 
control factors for both loan demand and loan supply, and allows the identification of 
long-run integration relationships that can be interpreted as loan supply and loan demand 
equations.  In this way, the fundamental identification problem inherent in a reduced 
form approach based on aggregate data is explicitly solved, and the importance of credit 
channel of monetary transmission is quantitatively measured in macro level.   
The contemporaneous causality among the macro series is checked by a directed 
graph. Then the short-run dynamics of the interested series can be appropriately 
investigated by impulse response analysis, incorporating the causality information.  This 
analysis helps to clarify the loan demand and loan supply puzzle.   
Three novel contributions of this study are made to the literature and empirical 
practice.  First, a large developing economy is studied for the first time within a time 
series framework (extant literature concerns mainly on developed countries for monetary 
transmission study).  Second, the fundamental identification problem inherent in using 
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macro-aggregated data is explicitly solved by the error correction model with controlled 
factors.  Third, the newly developed time series technique – error correction model 
combined with a directed graph – is adopted to help explore the complicated monetary 
transmission in China.   
  My data are time series data, and observations are probably non-stationary. 
Accordingly, I model the China banking and monetary data as an error correction model.  
Modeling the innovations from such a model allows us to investigate the causal structure 
in contemporaneous time and identify the short run and long run structure of series.  
Such models were first introduced in Swanson and Granger (1997), and have been 
developed by others such as Bessler and Yang (2003).   
The new method, called Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs), is used to identify the 
contemporaneous causality in error correction model in these studies.  Causal inference 
on directed graphs (DAGs) has recently been developed by Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines 
(2000), and Pearl (2000).  This method is able to shed light on contemporaneous 
relationships.   
The directed graphs literature attempts to infer causal relations from 
observational data.  The key idea is to use a statistical measure of independence, 
commonly a measure of conditional correlation, to systematically check the patterns of 
conditional independence and dependence and to work backwards to the class of 
admissible causal structures (Hoover, 2005).  While computers can be used to sort out 
causal flows from spurious flows and can sometimes distinguish an effect from a cause, 
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human intelligence is helpful to select the set of candidate variables (causal sufficient set) 
for the computer to study.  The causal sufficiency assumption suggests finding a 
sufficiently rich set of theoretically relevant variables to conduct the analysis, i.e., there 
is no omitted latent variable that causes two variables included in the study.  One of the 
advantages of using directed graphs is that results based on properties of the data can be 
compared to a prior knowledge of a structural model suggested by economic theory or 
subjective intuition (Awokuse and Bessler, 2003). 
Basically, I use the error correction model combined with directed graphs to 
show the contemporaneous causality structure on innovations.  Such structures can be 
identified through the directed graphs analysis of the correlation (covariance) matrix of 
observed innovations .  In this chapter, directed graphs are used to help in providing 
data-based evidence on causal ordering in contemporaneous time, assuming the 
information set is causally sufficient.  Moreover, the error correction model will allow us 
to identify the long-run and short-run time structure of the series, which enables us to get 
a clearer view on the relationship among bank loans, interest rates and real output.  In 
summary, I will study the complete properties of the time series that I am interested in 
and propose a clear acting pattern among loans, interest and output, and thus providing 
stronger support for the existence of bank lending channel or interest channel. 
teˆ
 
 
 
 79
 
 
Data 
The monetary reform in China lagged behind real sector reforms for more than a 
decade.  Although the PBC was established as a separate central bank as early as 1983, 
the role of the PBC as the central bank was not legally reinforced until 1995, when the 
Central Bank Law was enacted.  The Commercial Bank Law was also enacted at the 
time as the Central Bank Law .  The enactment of these two major laws marked the 
beginning of the banking sector and monetary reforms.  In 1996, the interbank market in 
China was unified via a computer network system.  The 1997 Asian financial crisis 
made the Chinese government feel an urgency to accelerate the monetary reforms (Shi 
2001, Qin et al 2005).   
The following time series analysis of the monetary transmission in China is 
based on quarterly data taken from the People’s Bank of China and the National Bureau 
of Statistics.  The time period under consideration starts with the first quarter of 1997 to 
the first quarter of 2006.   
Within the data sample, the execution of monetary policy in China causes 
changes in real output.  Expansions and contractions of credit affect both aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply, thus influencing aggregate activities. 
My time series analysis includes bank loans and interest rates.  With an immature 
equity and bond capital market, the financial system in China primarily depends on the 
banking sector; hence the aggregated bank loan data are important  According to China’s 
constitution, the state-owned sector is in a dominant position in the economy, and it co-
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exists with other ownership systems such as collective, township enterprises, self-
employed, private and individual firms, joint venture, etc.  They can be categorized into 
two big sectors: public and private.  Therefore, the bank loans will be separated into two 
terms: loans to the public sector and loans to the private sector.   
Since this study focuses on the effect of monetary transmission on the different 
economy sectors, I employ a five-variable ECM system – gross domestic product (GDP), 
interest rates (IR), loans to public sector (PB), loans to private sector (PR), and total 
Credit Funds available for lending (CF).  Similar variables have been used in previous 
studies (Lee 1992, Ali and Hasan 1993, Thorbecke 1997, Hulsewig et al. 2004, Allen et 
al. 2005).   
GDP is added as a measure of the general economic activity.  According to 
previous study, the GDP could be considered as a proxy for loan demand factors.  Of 
course, GDP may also have effect on loan supply, and I assume that this effect is 
relatively small compared with its impact on demand (Bondt 1999, Kakes 2000).    
Because banks may relate their loan supply decision to the amount of disposable 
capital, I can use CF as an approximate for disposable capital to control loan supply side.  
The total credit fund of banks include deposits, financial bonds, currency in circulation, 
and liabilities to IMF, and it is an important factor that attributes to loan supply rather 
than to loan demand.  I also include benchmark interest rate (IR) in my system as the 
control factor to both loan supply and demand.  The benchmark interest rates refer to the 
interest rates set up by PBC to influence markets, which is a fixed rate for financial 
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institutions to borrow from the PBC.  Interest rates are still under the strict control of the 
PBC. Recently, the PBC slowly started liberalization of interest rates by allowing for a 
floating band of commercial lending rates with a centrally controlled benchmark rate.  
Thus, the benchmark interest rate has an impact on both loan supply and loan demand.  
The interest rates are also useful for exploring the interest channel, which has the effect 
on demand side as well.  Studying such a system will identify the dynamics among all 
these variables, specifically what factors drive the change of bank loans and GDP.  The 
unique monetary policy design in China provides us a great chance to conduct the study 
for credit channel with fundamental identification problems explicitly solved. 
All series are quarterly and nominal with seasonal adjustment. The use of 
nominal value is also supported by related studies, e.g. James, Koreisha and Partch 
(1985).  The details of data are listed below in Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.1. Time Series Aggregated Data Sources and Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition Unit Data Source 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
1 billion 
Renminbi 
National Bureau of 
Statistics 
PB 
Short term loans13 to the 
public sector  
1 million 
Renminbi 
The People's Bank of China 
Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin 
PR 
Short term loans to the 
private sector 
1 million 
Renminbi 
The People's Bank of China 
Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin 
IR 
Benchmark interest rate: 6 
months or less 
% 
The People's Bank of China 
Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin 
CF Bank credit funds 
1 million 
Renminbi 
The People's Bank of China 
Quarterly Statistical 
Bulletin 
 
 
                                                     
13 As addressed in many monetary studies, the monetary policy may influence real economy through 
short-run instruments which cannot be fully adjusted to policy change.  The short term loans here refer to 
the loans with duration less than 1 year.   
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Results of ECM Analysis for Long Run Relationships 
Formal tests on the unit root to each series are applied to test for stationarity.  
Briefly, I accept the null hypothesis of a unit root on all series except IR by using the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller test, it is reasonable since adjustments to these interest rates 
are infrequent.  Because all variables except IR have a unit root, it is possible they are 
cointegrated, thus I conduct an error correction model in this study. 
The common procedure in previous studies to set up the error correction model 
(ECM) was to use either a trace test or information criterion to determine the lag order 
of the unrestricted VAR in the first step, and then use the same criterion to determine the 
cointegration rank and appropriate specification for ECM in the second step.  In this 
chapter, however, I will use a one step Schwart Loss Criterion (SLC) to determine the 
lag order and the cointegration vectors in the ECM simultaneously, which has been 
proven to work at least as well as or better in both efficiency and consistency than both 
the traditional trace test and the two-step approach (Wang and Bessler, 2004).   
Step by step, I check the Schwart Loss (SL) for each rank = 1, 2…n and each 
model specification by lags to find the lag that yields the lowest SL.  Because my data 
set has been adjusted for seasonality, 0 lag is not appropriate in this case, so I start 
search from lag 1 and continue to lag 12.  (Detailed statistics are listed in Appendix F).  I 
then apply a one-step Schwarz Loss criterion that identifies 3 lags and model 
specifications with quadratic deterministic trend in data, and assume intercept and trend 
in CE and linear trend in VAR for my error correction model.  Based on this criterion, I 
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adopt a rank r = 2, which means that I have two independent long-term relationships 
among variables to identify cointegration space and demand-supply relationship.  Table 
4.2 reports multiple test statistics; I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and normality at 5% significance level, which shows that the model is 
statistically well-specified. 
 
Table 4.2. Test for Misspecification 
 Test P-Value 
Autocorrelation  LM(1) 
LM(4) 
0.3735 
0.2140 
Normality Jarque-Bera Test  0.5218 
 
 
Notes:  
1. The test on autocorrelation is based on LM test with the null hypothesis that there is 
no serial correlation.  LM (1) is the test of first order autocorrelation on the residuals 
from the error correction model, and LM (4) is the test of fourth order autocorrelation on 
the residuals.  
2. The Jarque-Bera statistic is used for normality test, which has a distribution with 
two degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of normally distributed errors. 
2χ
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Let  denote a vector of selected variables.  The data generating process of 
could be appropriately modeled in such an error correction model: 
tX
tX
(4.1) , tt
i
itt eXXX ++Δ∑Γ+=Δ −=− μπ 111
where 'αβπ =  where β is the cointegration vectors, α is the adjustment vectors.  The 
long-run structure can be identified through cointegration vector β , and the short-run 
structure can be identified by testing hypotheses on adjustment vectorα and (Johansen 
and Juselius, 1994; Juselius, 1995; Johansen, 1995).  
Γ
The credit channel implies that the bank’s loan supply should depend positively 
on total credit fund CF, and negatively on the benchmark interest rate IR, while loan 
demand may depend positively on GDP.  I could also expect the total credit fund to 
increase with the level of economic activity.  I also want to know if the bank loans to the 
private or public sector will have a different impact on GDP.  In order to check these and 
identify the system, I normalized the first cointegration vector with respect to GDP, and 
the second cointegration vector with respect to IR.  The results are reported in Table 4.3 
below.  
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Table 4.3. Estimated Cointegration Vectors ( 'β ) with Normalization in GDP, IR 
GDP CF IR PB PR 
1 -2.0783 -14 0.0055 -39.3439 
- 0.007762 1 -0.00002 0.2343 
GDP: national domestic product. 
CF: total credit fund available. 
IR: benchmark interest rates. 
PB: bank loans to public sector. 
PR: bank loans to private sector. 
 
 
The first row in Table 4.3 indicates the following relationship can be interpreted 
as a long term economy equation: 
(4.2) GDP = 2.0783×CF - 0.0055×PB + 39.3439×PR15
which relates positive GDP growth to increase the total credit fund and credit to the 
private sector.  We see the negative sign associated with PB indicating that the 
expansion  
                                                     
14 We set the long coefficient in 'β associate with IR to zero in the first vector, and coefficient in 
'β associate with GDP to zero in the second vector, so we have two restrictions for each vector, which 
will exactly identify cointegration space ( 'β ). 
 
 
15 ECM assumes the error correction process is stationary, is not stationary, but is stationary 
(Johansen 1991), thus we can interpret the relations as stationary relations (long-run equilibrium) 
among nonstationary variables.  
tXΔ tX tX'β
tX'β
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of credits to the public sector hurts the economy instead, suggesting that the monetary 
transmission is not efficient in the public sector.  The positive sign associated with CF 
means that the growth of total credit fund would stimulate the economy in the positive 
direction, indicating that the monetary policy through credit channel is effective in China. 
The second row describes a long-run relationship for interest rate, 
(4.3) IR = -0.007762×CF + 0.00002×PB - 0.2343×PR, 
which could be explained as a policy rule for a central bank to set up the benchmark 
interest rates.  The equilibrium state is what economy wants, thereby with increase of 
total credit fund and credit to the private sector, the benchmark interest rate should be 
adjusted downward, while with increase of credit fund to public sector, the benchmark 
rate should be tuned up.  This also suggests that the benchmark interest rate in current 
China should be adjusted to prevent redundant capital from flowing into the public 
sector to maintain continuous economic growth in China.  
For the sake of identifying demand and supply equation in the long run 
individually, I normalize the two cointegration vectors with respect to both PB and PR 
and impose overidentifying restrictions16 on cointegrating vector ,β where  
(4.4) β =  representing the two long-run equations associate with 
GDP, CF, IR, PR, PR.  I have restrictions: 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
2524232221
1514131211
βββββ
βββββ
,,,,
,,,,
                                                     
 
 
16 We have 6 restrictions for two cointegration vectors, so it is overidentifying restrictions. 
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where φ  is unknown coefficients.  Under the null hypothesis that these restrictions are 
“true”, I apply the LR tests for binding restrictions, and have p-value 0.32, suggesting 
that I should accept the null hypothesis and these restrictions are consistent with the data.  
My overidentified β  matrix is listed in the Table 4.4: 
 
                                                     
 
 
17 We test for restrictions that impose no demand factor in the first equation, and no supply factor in the 
second equation.  Both coefficients associate with PB and PR are set to 1 so PB+PR could represent total 
bank loan supply or demand. 
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Table 4.4. Estimated Cointegration Vectors with Over Identifying  
Restrictions Imposed. 
 
GDP CF IR PB PR 
0 -252.82 9106512 1 1 
-955.5709 0 26390353 1 1 
GDP: national domestic product. 
CF: total credit fund available. 
IR: benchmark interest rates. 
PB: bank loans to public sector. 
PR: bank loans to private sector. 
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Therefore I have these two long run equations for loan demand and loan supply 
respectively: 
(4.7) PB + PR = 252.82×CF - 9106512× IR  
(4.8) PB + PR = 955.5709×GDP - 26390353× IR  
The first equation can be explained as loan supply equation where loan supply is 
negatively related to the benchmark interest rate, and positively related to total credit 
fund. This is expected if the credit channel is active.  The large coefficients suggest that 
loan supply is sensitive to shifts in credit availability and benchmark interest rates.  This 
is what bank lending channel implies that tightened monetary policy will cause bank 
loans supplied to decrease if the bank lending channel is operative.  This is necessary 
condition for the bank lending channel to be operative and the results support this. 
The second equation could be interpreted as loan demand equation.  I see that the 
positive GDP shocks drive up the demand to bank loans, and the positive shocks of IR 
will reduce the demand to bank loans.  This supports the existence of interest channel 
that the increasing interest rates will raise the cost of money and cut the demand for 
bank loans.   
For a deeper insight in the error correction process, I performed LR tests on 
restrictions on the adjustment vectorα to see whether there is any evidence that some 
variables may be weakly exogenous (see Ericsson, Hendry, and Mizon (1998) for a 
formal discussion on weak exogeneity).  A variable can be treated as weakly exogenous 
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if its coefficients of all error correction terms in α  are zero, implying that the respective 
equation in the first difference does not contain information about the long-run 
parameters β .  The LR test statistics on joint zero restrictions for each variable are 
documented in Table 4.5 and have been carried out without imposing restrictions on β .  
The test results show that the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity cannot be rejected for 
GDP and CF, indicating it is appropriate to choose these two as control factors in my 
loan demand and supply identification.   
 
Table 4.5. Test of Weak Exogeneity of GDP, CF, IR, PB, PR 
 
Series chi-square p-value Decision 
GDP 1.0567 0.5896  F 
CF 4.5606 0.1022  F 
IR 5.3292 0.0696  R 
PB 14.6827 0.0006  R 
PR 31.3824 0.0000  R 
GDP: national domestic product. 
CF: total credit fund available. 
IR: benchmark interest rates. 
PB: bank loans to public sector. 
PR: bank loans to private sector. 
 
 
In short, the long-run equilibrium analysis solve the inherent identification 
problem in loan supply and demand explicitly, and supports my hypothesis that the 
credit channel is effective in the long run which is reflected on the efficiency of 
monetary transmission in the private sector.   
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Directed Graphs and Impulse Response for Contemporaneous and Short-
Run Dynamics 
It is well recognized that the individual coefficients of the error correction model 
are difficult to interpret, which in turn makes it difficult to explain the short-run structure.  
Instead, innovative accounting may be the best form of studying the dynamic structure 
over the time (Sims, 1980; Swanson and Granger, 1997).  Based on recently developed 
directed graph technique, I can identify the contemporaneous causality among the series 
and provide the correct ordering for impulse response.  Accordingly, I skip the detailed 
estimates of ECM and report the directed graph and the impulse response only. 
The contemporaneous structure on innovations can be identified through a priori 
structural modeling of observed innovations or through the directed graph analysis of the 
correlation (covariance) matrix of (Pearl 1995, Swanson and Granger, 1997). I report 
the lower triangular elements of the correlation matrix on innovations (errors) from the 
error correction model in Table 4.6 below.  It is this matrix that provides the starting 
point for my analysis of contemporaneous causation using directed graphs.  By using 
TETRAD III, I get the directed graphs in Figure 4.3.  Using DAG at a 10% significance 
level
teˆ
18 (I choose a 10% significance level because the data points are less than 100, see 
Bessler and Lee 2002, Bessler and Yang 2003), I find the innovations in GDP  
 
 
                                                     
18 We use both PC Algorithm and GES Algorithm and obtain the same directed graph. 
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significantly contemporaneously cause innovations in both PB (bank loans to public 
sector) and CF (total credit funds available), and a causality running from innovations in 
IR (benchmark interest rate) to innovations in CF and then to innovations in PB 
contemporaneously.  This is expected since both demand and supply shocks exist in 
contemporaneous time taking the effect on CF, and thus cause the change of PB in 
current time.  Two points are worthy of further consideration.  One is that there is no 
edge pointed to GDP, indicating neither bank loans nor interest rates has effect on real 
economy in contemporaneous time.  It is not true that monetary policy takes effect 
immediately, since borrowers and lenders always adjust to the change of monetary 
policy over time.  Second, PR is not entering any contemporaneous causality; there is no 
edge between PR and any other variable.  However, PB is very responsive to the shocks 
from other variables except PR.  Current policy changes such as adjustment of 
benchmark interest rates cause the change of total credit funds available, and thus 
change the bank loan supplied to the public sector, but bank loans supplied to the private 
sector seems unaffected.  It is consistent with the current situation of Chinese financial 
market in which the public sector raises the most capital.  The private sector obtains less 
share of total capital and it has become a severe problem for the development of the 
private sector in China. 
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Table 4.6. Correlation Matrix of Innovations (Errors) on GDP, CF, IR, PB, PR 
 
  GDP CF IR PB PR
GDP 1     
CF -0.31437 1    
IR -0.09527 -0.57319 1   
PB -0.67777 0.77956 -0.33647 1  
PR -0.21739 -0.03542 0.01969 -0.04745 1
 
GDP: Measure of general economic activity. 
CF: Total available credit fund for banks 
IR: Central bank benchmark interest rate. 
PB: Bank loans to the public sector. 
PR: Bank loans to the private sector. 
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Figure 4.3. Directed graph on GDP, CF, IR, PB, PR 
GDP: Measure of general economic activity. 
CF: Total available credit fund for banks 
IR: Central bank benchmark interest rate. 
PB: Bank loans to the public sector. 
PR: Bank loans to the private sector. 
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Since I identified the order of contemporaneous innovations19, I then check the 
impulse response of variables in 5-year (20 periods) segments to cover both short-run 
and long-run structure. 
As discussed in Hamilton (1994), a common, but technically unsound 
interpretation of an impulse-response function is the effect of a primitive impulse on 
variable Yj,t+k.  A more technically accurate interpretation of an impulse response 
function is the revision in the conditional forecast of some variable Yj,t+k given a past 
shock to some other variables Yi,t.  Sims (1980) and others have noted that when there is 
contemporaneous correlation among variables, the choice of ordering in the Choleski 
decomposition, which is the base of an impulse response derivation, may make a 
significant difference for interpretation of impulse responses.  I use directed graphs as an 
alternative to the widely used Choleski factorization of contemporaneous correlation to 
determine the Choleski ordering required in the impulse response.  Such applications of 
directed graphs in finance and economic studies are now commonplace (Awokuse and 
Bessler 2003, Bessler and Yang 2003, Kalai 2003, Yang et al. 2006). 
19 PR (bank loans to private sector) has not entered my identified contemporaneous structure, so we tried 
all possible orders for PR in the Choleski ordering and obtained quite robust impulse responses indicating 
that the order of PR in the Choleski ordering does not matter. 
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Figure 4.4 below plots the impulse response of each variable to one positive 
shock of IR, which could be interpreted as their reaction to an unexpected monetary 
tightening.  The simulation covers a period of 20 quarters. 
Within the impulse response as plotted in Figure 4.4, the monetary policy shocks 
of the benchmark interest rate bring in the dramatic decrease of GDP in the first year.  
The GDP then follows a mean reverting process and returns to a level slightly below the 
base level.  The CF decreases for about 12 quarters, then slightly increases, then levels 
out.  This is consistent with a monetarist view that the tightened bank lending will drive 
down the real output, and the total available credits for lending is also cut back.  It’s 
worth noting that the moving pattern of GDP to shocks of IR follows the same pattern as 
that of PR albeit at 2 or 3 lag level.  Such adjustment of GDP suggests that the bank 
loans to the private sector (PR) have certain effect on GDP in the short run.  Following 
the rise or decline in PR, the GDP consequently begin to rise or fall in the subsequent 
periods.   
 98
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Figure 4.4. Impulse response of all variables to shocks of IR in 20 periods 
Vertical Unit: Million Renminbi (Chinese currency). 
GDP: national domestic product. 
CF: total credit fund available. 
IR: benchmark interest rates. 
PB: bank loans to public sector. 
PR: bank loans to private sector. 
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 According to the bank lending channel, the fall of total bank funds will worsen 
the lending situation, and banks would thus decrease the lending size.  On the other hand, 
the increase of total bank funds will large the lending size and benefit the economy.  
This is represented by Figure 4.5.  With a positive response to total bank funds (CF), the 
bank loans to the public sector (PB) show an immediate and significant increase in the 
first 2 quarters followed by a sharp decrease in the third quarter, then swing in such a 
band upward after that.  The swing process of bank loans to the private sector (PR) is in 
a much smaller range compared to that of public sector, contrary to the response of 
public sector, PR goes down in the first 2 quarters and jumps in the next 3 quarters, then 
swing in a tighter band.  Such different response patterns reveal the fact that the lending 
inclination is still to favor the public sector but not private sector in current China, the 
increase of total credit funds will greatly benefit the public sector first.  What is more, I 
also see that the supply shocks from credit fund has a great impact to the public sector 
than that to the private sector, implying that public sector adjusts to the exogenous 
shocks very sensitively, however, the private sector has much smaller responses to such 
shocks.  Of course, the public sector has the dominant advantage in financial market 
presently; it is much easier for public sector than private to obtain bank loans when total 
lending is increasing, and substitute bank loans from other financial finds when lending 
is cut back.   
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Figure 4.5. Impulse response of PB, PR to shocks of CF in 20 periods 
Vertical Unit: Million Renminbi (Chinese currency). 
CF: total credit fund available. 
PB: bank loans to public sector. 
PR: bank loans to private sector. 
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  Moreover, I want to check if PB and PR have different effect on GDP, thus I run 
the impulse of GDP to the shock of PB and PR (see Figure 4.6), and compare the 
responses.  I find that innovations of PR (credit to the private sector) have always had a 
stronger effect on GDP than that of PB (credit to the public sector) in most periods.  
Generally I conclude this section that the credit channel (both bank lending 
channel and interest channel) appears to be operative in China in the short run.  My 
impulse response results suggest that loan supply effect in addition to loan demand 
effect contribute to the propagation of a monetary policy tool (IR).  It is also worth 
noting that the effect of the credit to private sector on real output (GDP) appears much 
stronger than that of the public sector, suggesting that monetary transmission has been 
more efficient in private sector than public sector.  
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Figure 4.6. Impulse response of GDP to shocks of PB, PR in 20 periods 
Vertical Unit: Million Renminbi (Chinese currency). 
GDP: national domestic product. 
PB: bank loans to public sector. 
PR: bank loans to private sector. 
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Conclusion 
Theoretical literature on monetary transmission suggests that the monetary policy 
can take effect on the real economy through several ways.  The most noteworthy one is 
credit channels, including the bank lending channel and the interest channel (balance 
sheet channel).  
In this study, I attempt to apply these theoretical insights to the case of China.  
Motivated by recent debate in identifying the credit channel, I first use the error 
correction model to check the long-run equilibrium, which could be interpreted as loan 
demand and loan supply equation by including separate controlling factors for loan 
demand and loan supply respectively as I address in section 4.   Thereby the inherent 
identification problem in loan supply and demand has been solved explicitly.  My long-
run equilibrium results support the hypothesis that the credit channel is effective in the 
long run which work through the monetary transmission to the private sector.  The credit 
channel interest channel and including bank lending channel is proved to function 
operatively in current China, indicating that central bank of China could take the effect 
on real economy by influencing the interest rates and bank loan supplied.   
Moreover, I adopt the directed graph and impulse response analysis to 
investigate the contemporaneous and short-run dynamics among variables.  My directed 
graph shows that both demand and supply shocks exist in contemporaneous time, and 
affect CF causing a change in PB in current time.  Two points are worthy of further 
consideration.  First, there are no innovations of any variable to cause a change in GDP, 
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indicating that it takes time for monetary policy to impact the real economy through 
credit channels.  Second, the causality between PR and other variables cannot be 
identified in contemporaneous time.  Current policy changes such as adjustment of the 
benchmark interest rate negatively cause change of total credit funds available, and thus 
change the bank loan supplied to the public sector, but bank loans supplied to the private 
sector seems unaffected.  It is consistent with current situation of Chinese financial 
market in which the public sector raises the most capital.  On the other side, the private 
sector obtains a much smaller share of total capital and it has become a severe problem 
for the development of the private sector in China.  
My impulse response analysis supports a monetarist view that tightened bank 
lending will drive down the real output in the short run.  I also find that innovations of 
PR (credit to private sector) have always had a stronger effect on GDP than PB (credit to 
the public sector) in most periods.  
In summary, in both the short run and long run my results indicate that monetary 
policy has real effects through credit channel, and such effects are quantitatively 
important.  I show that credit channels including both bank lending channel and interest 
channel are still operative and play a very important role in monetary transmission in the 
Chinese economy.  I find that the credit channel might be sufficient to explain monetary 
transmission in China.  This study provides useful guidance about the next step in 
studying the monetary transmission in China.  With financial markets continuously 
developing, the credit channel still should be the reliable channel in the long run.   
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My empirical results also imply that there exists a great difference in the 
efficiency between monetary transmission to the private sector and the public sector in 
China.  The credits allocated to the private sector contribute more significantly to the 
Chinese economy.  Comparison of the different efficiency of the two sectors can provide 
policy makers with very useful information as to what sector is the main priority for 
credit distribution in the long run.    
These findings have important policy implications to China’s future development, 
given that high economic growth in China is always in doubt for its sustainability.  As 
shown in this study, appropriate monetary policy through credit channel can play an 
important role in the economy in the short and long run.  Moreover, to improve China’s 
efficiency, further policy measures must be advanced to stimulate the development of 
the private sector, and provide greater lending support to both the private and public 
sector.  I believe the development of monetary policy, through its credit channel to the 
private sector, can provide strong support to the growth of this emerging sector, which 
will in turn continuously foster China’s economic development. 
I realize that the rather short duration of these series may limit potential for 
achieving conclusive statistical results.  I precede time series analysis mindfully that any 
results may have been improved had longer series of data been available.   
An interesting question I might study in the future is if credit crunch is generated by 
greatly reducing deposits, should the monetary authority increase rather than decrease 
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the deposit rate during a credit crunch.  This is the other debated question worthy of 
attention in the monetary transmission in China.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Based on the recent empirical studies addressing the essential question of effect 
of monetary policy on macro economy, it is likely that monetary policy has a substantial 
positive impact on economic growth.  It has two important policy implications, 
especially for developing countries such as China. 
1. To gain sustainable economic growth, it is desirable to further undertake monetary 
policy reforms 
2. To take advantage of the positive interaction between monetary and economic 
development, government should develop the economy while reform the financial 
system.  In other words, not only should it be addressed for developing monetary 
policy, policies that promote development in the real economy should also be 
emphasized.  
  This study finds that monetary policy actions transmitted through various 
interrelated channels have a significant impact on real economic activity, which means 
monetary policy does matter.  But the bank lending channel currently appears to no 
longer be of aggregate importance in U.S. (i.e. the expansion of commercial/industrial 
loans does not result in aggregate output growth).  The error correction model and 
causality analysis do not provide evidence supporting the hypothesis that the lending 
channel is currently aggregately effective, while we do show that that bank loans 
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together with investment still takes the neutral effect on the economy by attenuating the 
effect of interest channel in U.S. 
In the case of China, our results indicate that monetary policy has real effects 
through credit channel including bank lending channel and interest channel, and such 
effects are quantitatively important.  We show that credit channels are still operative and 
play a very important role in monetary transmission and China economy.  We find that 
the credit channel might be sufficient to explain monetary transmission in China, and 
some other channels might not be operative at this time.  The results provide useful 
guidance about the next step in studying the monetary transmission in China.  With 
financial market continuously developing, the credit channel still should be the reliable 
channel in the long run.   
Our empirical results also imply that there exists a great difference in the 
efficiency between monetary transmission to private sector and that to public sector in 
China: the credits allocated to the private sector contribute more significantly to China 
economy.  Comparison of the different efficiency of two sectors can provide policy 
makers with very useful information as to what sector is the in priority for credit 
distribution in the long run.    
  
 
.  .   
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APPENDIX A 
 
One step Schwartz Loss Criteria (SLC) by Lags on the Number of cointegrating 
vectors (r) and model specifications fit over the whole period 1950:Q1-2003:Q3 
 Models 
 
Rank 
No intercept 
No trend1
Intercept 
No trend I2
Intercept 
No trend II3
Intercept 
Trend I4
 Intercept 
Trend II5
-------------------------------------------------Lag 1------------------------------------------------- 
1 29.88382 29.87862* 29.96190 29.87913 29.93264 
2 29.95153 29.95474 30.01312 29.94704 30.00344 
3 31.12462 31.14790 30.19161 30.14141 30.17754 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 2------------------------------------------------- 
1 30.08731 30.06951 30.13975 30.04477 30.13178 
2 30.22458 30.22498 30.27049 30.19175 30.25736 
3 30.38920 30.40432 30.44763 30.39070 30.43155 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 3------------------------------------------------- 
1 30.22887 30.23516 30.30838 30.26469 30.33248 
2 30.37361 30.38810 30.44020 30.40986 30.45712 
3 30.54799 30.58555 30.61368 30.60836 30.65041 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 4------------------------------------------------- 
1 30.63633 30.64632 30.71251 30.68558 30.75451 
2 30.79797 30.81156 30.85645 30.84877 30.89249 
3 30.98229 31.01693 31.04558 31.05162 31.08907 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 5------------------------------------------------- 
1 30.86568 30.87335 30.94412 30.94810 30.99850 
2 31.02109 31.04419 31.09529 31.10505 31.13466 
3 31.21649 31.24201 31.27546 31.30959 31.33342 
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Note that one step Shwartz Loss criterion picked model specification 2, while SUP-LM test about this 
specification is not available, so I chose the closest specification 1. 
 
1 Test assumes no deterministic trend in data, and no intercept or trend in cointegrating equation (CE) 
or test VAR;   
2 Test assumes no deterministic trend in data, have intercept (no trend) in CE, but no intercept in VAR;  
3 Test allows for linear deterministic trend in data, and assume intercept (no trend) in CE and test VAR;  
4 Test allows for linear deterministic trend in data, and assume intercept and trend in CE, but no trend 
in VAR;  
5 Test allows for quadratic deterministic trend in data, and assume intercept and trend in CE and linear 
trend in VAR. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
One step Schwartz Loss Criteria (SLC) by Lags on the number of cointegrating 
vectors (r) and model specifications fit over the period 1955:Q4 – 1968:Q3 
 Models 
 
Rank 
No intercept 
No trend1
Intercept 
No trend I2
Intercept 
No trend 
II3
Intercept 
Trend I4
 Intercept 
Trend II5
-------------------------------------------------Lag 1------------------------------------------------- 
1 22.06027*  22.13062 22.29849 22.37199 22.46612 
2 22.35688 22.50316 22.63935 22.77578 22.79814 
3 22.83218 22.98631 23.11242 23.21865 23.22390 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 2------------------------------------------------- 
1 23.07550 23.10828 23.32026 23.36563 23.42762 
2 23.41031 23.51810 23.72920 23.81777 23.82641 
3 23.91123 24.03153 24.17947 24.30509 24.30071 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 3------------------------------------------------- 
1 24.33124 24.35453 24.56916 24.60901 24.69353 
2 24.75197 24.75579 24.93359 25.01029 25.10581 
3 25.21949 25.28070 25.41471 25.56382 25.66258 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 4------------------------------------------------- 
1 25.65205 25.52628 25.77665 25.82283 25.79758 
2 25.89343 25.78933 25.98415 26.08525 26.14566 
3 26.34611 26.26985 26.45418 26.60680 26.64658 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 5------------------------------------------------- 
1 26.66565 26.20318 26.48966 26.53115 26.53142 
2 26.89677 26.47735 26.72361 26.81841 26.95869 
3 27.38849 27.02698 27.21410 27.35936 27.45560 
Note: For models specification, check Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
One step Schwartz Loss Criteria (SLC) by Lags on the number of cointegrating 
vectors (r) and model specifications fit over the period 1981:Q4-2003:Q3 
 Models 
 
Rank 
No intercept 
No trend1
Intercept 
No trend I2
Intercept 
No trend 
II3
Intercept 
Trend I4
 Intercept 
Trend II5
-------------------------------------------------Lag 1------------------------------------------------- 
1 31.84932 31.78269 31.76133* 31.79802 31.96197 
2 32.05032 31.90609 31.99899 32.04449 32.16116 
3 32.35547 32.25855 32.31217 32.34221 32.43077 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 2------------------------------------------------- 
1 32.27828 32.24965 32.35850 32.31626 32.46702 
2 32.51003 32.43031 32.53818 32.49394 32.62524 
3 32.88717 32.84172 32.91099 32.84673 32.93352 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 3------------------------------------------------- 
1 32.84437 32.86444 33.01398 33.01755 33.16729 
2 33.17256 33.12262 33.22219 33.26832 33.38508 
3 33.52241 33.52314 33.60062 33.66738 33.73475 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 4------------------------------------------------- 
1 33.66371 33.70071 33.85043 33.86292 34.01807 
2 33.96099 34.00988 34.11109 34.16440 34.28825 
3 34.32409 34.37852 34.45355 34.55657 34.63190 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 5------------------------------------------------- 
1 34.23890 34.28624 34.43404 34.46466 34.57964 
2 34.56255 34.60067 34.72762 34.80872 34.88625 
3 34.92804 34.98264 35.07308 35.20499 35.24226 
Note: For models specification, check Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
One step Schwarz Loss Criteria (SLC) by Lags on the number of cointegrating 
vectors I and model specifications fit over the whole period Jan. 1997 - Aug. 2005
 Models 
 
Rank 
No intercept 
No trend1
Intercept 
No trend I2
Intercept 
No trend II3
Intercept 
Trend I4
 Intercept 
Trend II5
-------------------------------------------------Lag 1------------------------------------------------- 
1 -11.76184 -11.72006 -11.54451 -11.66872 -11.50748 
2 -11.82075 -11.92959* -11.79949 -11.87840 -11.76138 
3 -11.78021 -11.91783 -11.83297 -11.91374 -11.84150 
4 -11.45165 -11.69805 -11.65878 -11.70610 -11.67952 
5 -11.02761 -11.27578 -11.27578 -11.31116 -11.31116 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 2------------------------------------------------- 
1 -11.43870 -11.41660 -11.24124 -11.31957 -11.16679 
2 -11.42304 -11.39402 -11.2647 -11.36917 -11.26171 
3 -11.22015 -11.32106 -11.23765 -11.32802 -11.26642 
4 -10.80262 -10.98676 -10.9494 -11.03024 -11.01325 
5 -10.34572 -10.49390 -10.4939 -10.55792 -10.55792 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 3------------------------------------------------- 
1 -10.93764 -10.89142 -10.7163 -10.82193 -10.67744 
2 -10.74202 -10.80924 -10.68027 -10.74515 -10.64684 
3 -10.47747 -10.54284 -10.45965 -10.64959 -10.59758 
4 -10.03311 -10.14942 -10.11164 -10.28738 -10.27499 
5 -9.56915 -9.64815 -9.64815 -9.81195 -9.81195 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 4------------------------------------------------- 
1 -10.42730 -10.38079 -10.20645 -10.18759 -10.03216 
2 -10.11136 -10.20318 -10.07559 -10.13242 -10.02245 
3 -9.77295 -9.83412 -9.75247 -9.93494 -9.86913 
4 -9.32429 -9.39813 -9.36320 -9.50030 -9.48067 
5 -8.86064 -8.89708 -8.89708 -9.01298 -9.01298 
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-------------------------------------------------Lag 5------------------------------------------------- 
1 -9.62344 -9.58922 -9.41301 -9.39167 -9.24818 
2 -9.29745 -9.36447 -9.23528 -9.22550 -9.12657 
3 -8.91970 -8.95229 -8.86779 -9.00020 -8.94733 
4 -8.46216 -8.51218 -8.47453 -8.56994 -8.56421 
5 -7.99054 -8.00329 -8.00329 -8.09478 -8.09478 
 
Note: For models specification, check Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Estimates of ECM during the Period Jan. 1997 – Aug. 2005 
 
Note： T-statistics are included in parenthesis. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
One step Schwarz Loss Criteria (SLC) by Lags on the number of cointegrating 
vectors I and model specifications fit over the whole period 1997:Q1-2006:Q1 
 Models 
 
Rank 
No intercept 
No trend1
Intercept 
No trend I2
Intercept 
No trend II3
Intercept 
Trend I4
 Intercept 
Trend II5
-------------------------------------------------Lag 1------------------------------------------------- 
1 71.57951 71.66871 71.68147 71.77866 71.33064 
2 71.62170 71.78709 71.70304 71.89666 71.72248 
3 71.98073 72.22853 72.38925 72.46353 72.35970 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 2------------------------------------------------- 
1 71.06130 68.40003 68.45861 68.47091 68.04470 
2 70.85077 68.28022 68.33159 68.41677 68.18655 
3 71.07874 68.60925 68.63042 68.81386 68.52695 
-------------------------------------------------Lag 3------------------------------------------------- 
1 68.40656 68.37601 68.69303 68.64215 68.07586 
2 68.72368 68.21298 68.42580 68.31941 67.69355* 
3 69.16640 68.63666 68.74473 68.21674 67.97580 
Note: For models specification, check Appendix A. 
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